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INTRODUCTION

In May 1997, the membership of the American Law Institute (ALI)
voted to adopt its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)").1 This historic vote occurred some thirty years after the
ALI first articulated the theory of strict liability in tort in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") ,2 and twentyone years after the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted section
402A as the law of Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 3 As Maryland has yet to adopt the Restatement (Third), its precedent in the products liability arena is rooted in statutory and common law developed
from the Restatement (Second).
The ALI's formulation of section 402A liability in turn was rooted
primarily in the experience of claims for manufacturing defects. In
the three decades since its adoption by the ALI, the law of products
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LlAB. (1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. See infra text accompanying note 394 in the Appendix for the
text of section 402A.
3. 278 Md. 337,363 A.2d 955 (1976). See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Phipps v. General Motors Corp.
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liability has expanded exponentially and the breadth of that development is now reflected in the ALI's newest Restatement. This latest ALI
effort reflects thirty years of common-law precedent concerning design-defect claims, failure-to-warn claims, crashworthiness/ enhanced
injury claims, special rules for claims arising out of contaminated
human blood and prescription products, claims involving products
whose manufacturers cannot be identified, changes in burdens of
proof and quantum of proof, the limits of recovery for so-called "pure
economic loss," judicial and legislative adoption of comparative fault
principles, evidentiary issues involving compliance and noncompliance with safety statutes and regulations, statutory preemption of common-law liability principles, and claims testing the limits of
foreseeability and the appropriate allocation of social responsibility
for accidents arising out of products placed in the stream of commerce by commercial enterprises. In short, the law of products liability has gone far beyond its simple origins as articulated in section
402A of the Restatement (Second).
This Article sets forth the twenty-one sections comprising the ALI's
replacement for section 402A and contrasts the principles enunciated
in those new sections with current Maryland products liability law. 4
The Article identifies the areas of congruence, points of divergence,
and territory explored in the Restatement (Third) yet uncharted in Maryland appellate decisions.
II.

CHAPTER 1: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLERS BASED ON DEFECTS AT TIME OF SALE

A.

Liability Rules Applicable to Products Generally

l.

Section 1: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm
Caused by Defective Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otheIWise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the product defect. 5
4. The "black letter" of each section of the Restatement (Third) oj Torts: Products
Liability ("Restatement (Third)") is reprinted as the heading of each subsection, following the chapter and heading organization adopted and promulgated by the ALI at its May 20, 1997 membership meeting. To conserve
space only the black letter of the Restatement (Third) appears; the official
comments and the Reporters' Notes have been omitted. Undoubtedly, as
was true with section 402A, the comments will be looked to by the courts as
an invaluable guide in interpreting the new black letter provisions. It
should be remembered that when the Court of Appeals of Maryland
adopted section 402A strict liability, it also adopted all of the official comments that went with it. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 436,
601 A.2d 633,641 reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665, 602 A.2d 1182 (1992);
Phipps, 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1.
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This general rule of tort liability applies to commercial sellers and
other distributors for harm caused by defective products. Liability
rules specific to certain types of products are set forth in sections 5
through 8 under the next topic. 6
Section 1 reflects the expansion of products liability law from cases
involving manufacturing defects-upon which section 402A of the Restatement (Second) was grounded-to cases of design defects or defects
based on inadequate warnings or instructions. 7
The majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland,S recognize these
three categories of defect in products liability law. Maryland cases reflect the general difficulties of courts nationwide attempting to fit all
three categories of defect into the same doctrinal mold under section
402A.
The Restatement (Third) recognizes that the rule developed to protect users from manufacturing defects-where a seller is held liable
for harm caused by the defect although all possible care has been exercised in the preparation of the product-is inappropriate to resolve
claims of defective design and defects based on inadequate warnings
or instructions. Using a traditional negligence "reasonableness test,"
subsections 2(b) and 2(c) require a determination that the product
could have reasonably been made safe by a better design, instruction,
or warning. 9 This alleviates the difficulties found using section 402A
principles with these product-defect categories. This too is consistent
with current Maryland law. 1o
2.

Section 2: Categories of Product Defects
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible
care was exercised in the preparation and marketing
of the product;

6. See infra notes 127-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of sections 5
through 8 of Restatement (Third).
7. See infra notes 11-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 2 of
the Restatement (Third).
8. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976);
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701
(1988); Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622
(1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co.,
317 Md. 185,562 A.2d 1246 (1989).
9. See infra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2 of the Restatement (Third).
10. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of subsections
2(b) and 2(c).
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(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe. 1 1
"Strict products liability" is a term of art recognizing that products
liability, an area of tort law, borrows concepts from both negligence
and warranty law. I2 Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) clarifies the
existing categories of products liability by defining them: a product
may be defective upon its sale or distribution as a result of its manufacture, design, or failure to warn. 13
Maryland courts resolve product defects under section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) recognizing the same three categories of defect.I4
A product is defective if: (1) at the time of sale, the product contained
a flaw that made it more dangerous than intended; (2) the product's
manufacturer failed to adequately warn the consumer of a risk or hazard; or (3) the product was defectively designed. I5
Under section 402A, recovery for any defect requires that: (1) the
product was in a defective condition at the time it left the seller's control; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user; (3) the
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2.
12. [d. § 1 cmt. a.
13. [d. § 2.
14. See generally Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955
(1976).
15. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 118, 740 A.2d 102, 117 (1999).
A "defective condition" is present when the "product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. Comment i defines an "unreasonably dangerous"
product as one that is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
[the contemplation of] the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
[d. § 402A cmt. i. In design defect cases, however, Maryland courts employ
the "risk/utility" balancing test rather than a "consumer-expectation test"
to determine whether a specific design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. See Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. at 118, 740 A.2d at 117; see also
infra notes 72-75.
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defect caused the injury; and (4) the product was expected to and did
reach the user without a substantial change in its condition. 16

a.

Manufacturing Defects

Section 2(a) imposes liability irrespective of whether a manufacturer's quality control efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness. Maryland subscribes to this ruleP
Liability without fault is imposed on manufacturing defects rather
than design or warning defects because manufacturing defects may be
caused by fault difficult to prove. 18 Also, manufacturing flaws may be
said to disappoint reasonable consumer expectations as to product
performance. Moreover, sellers of products are in a better position
than consumers to insure against the statistical risks of manufacturing
defects and spread that risk through product pricing. 19
(1)

Maryland's Adoption and Application of Strict Liability for Manufacturing Defects

In a strict liability claim involving a manufacturing defect the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the product was in a
defective condition when it left the hands of the manufacturer. 2o Unless evidence is offered to prove the defect, the burden is not met. 21
Strict liability under section 402A for a manufacturing defect was
adopted in Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors Corp.22 In Phipps, the
plaintiff was injured when the accelerator of his employer's vehicle
locked, resulting in a collision. 23 Reasoning that defective products
result in injuries and the cost of these i~uries should be borne by the
manufacturer rather than the injured victims, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland abandoned the contractual privity between the plaintiff and
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
17. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958 ("[I]n an action founded on strict
liability in tort, as opposed to a traditional negligence action, the plaintiff
need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the seller. The
relevant inquiry ... focuses not on the conduct of the seller, but rather on
the product itself."); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 48485, 608 A.2d 1276, 1280 (1992) (dicta); Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685
F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law) ("In manufacturing
defect cases, the plaintiff proves that the product is defective simply by
showing that it does not conform to the manufacturer's specifications.").
See generally MARYLAND ClVlL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 26:14 (3d ed. 1993
& Supp. 1998) [hereinafter MPJI].
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
19. [d.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g.
21. [d.
22. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
23. [d. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956.
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the manufacturer required for recovery.24 The court recognized that
strict liability was imposed by law rather than by contract. 25 For a
manufacturer to be liable under section 402A, the product must be
defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves the manufacturer's hands. 26
(2)

Maryland Plaintiffs' Burden to Prove Defect, Attribution, and
Causation

In addition to satisfYing section 402A, Maryland courts impose a
burden on a plaintiff to prove that a defect in the product exists, that
the defect is attributed to the seller, and that the defect was the pr:oximate cause of the accident. 27 For instance, inJensen v. American Motors
Corp.,28 the plaintiff was injured after his jeep, manufactured by the
defendant, rolled over on the highway.29 The defendant was granted
summary judgment because Mr. Jensen did not prove a causal relationship between the defect and the accident.30 He unsuccessfully relied on circumstantial evidence to infer that the accident was caused
by a defect in the vehicle. 31 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
held that, "proof of a defect must arise above surmise, conjecture or
speculation; and one's right to recovery may not rest on any presumption from the happening of an accident."32
Similarly, in Singleton v. International Harvester CO.,33 a plaintiff suffered injuries when his tractor, manufactured by the defendant, overturned. 34 The plaintiff contended that his injuries were caused by the
absence of a rollover protective structure, which was a defect in design
and not manufacture. The trial court dismissed the case because
there was insufficient proof of both defect and a causal connection to
the defendant. 35 The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, affirmed
the trial court, holding that a strict liability claim, regardless of
24. [d. at 342,343,363 A.2d at 957,958. This allows the risk to be shifted to the
manufacturer, who is in a better financial position to absorb the loss. [d. at
343, 363 A.2d at 958.
25. [d. at 342, 363 A.2d at 958. Previously, manufacturer defects claims were
based on the theory of an express or implied warranty between the plaintiff
and the manufacturer. [d.
26. [d. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959.
27. See Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 437 A.2d 242
(1981); Virgil v. Kash N' Carry Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 484A.2d 652 (1984);
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Indus., 74 Md. App. 613,539 A.2d 701 (1988).
28. 50 Md. App. 226,437 A.2d 242 (1981).
29. [d. at 228, 437 A.2d at 244.
30. [d.
31. [d. The driver testified that he last heard a squeal in the tires and then lost
control of his vehicle. [d. These facts were insufficient to draw an inference that a defect was the cause of the accident. [d.
32. [d. at 232, 437 A.2d at 242.
33. 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981).
34. [d. at 113.
35. [d. at 114.
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whether a defect in manufacture or design is alleged, must focus on
the product and not the reasonableness of the manufacturer. 36 As the
plaintiff was unable to produce sufficient evidence to establish a connection between a defect in the product and the cause of the accident, his case was dismissed. 37
This burden has been more easily met in other fact situations that
involve an alleged defect in manufacturing as opposed to a defect in
design.38 Various Maryland cases have ruled that evidence of few facts,
in addition to an accident occurring, may be sufficient to raise an inference of a manufacturing defect by circumstantial evidence. 39 A
plaintiff must introduce evidence supporting the following threeprongs in a products liability claim: "(1) the existence ofa defect, (2)
the attribution of the defect to the seller, and (3) a causal relation
between the defect and the injury."4o
In Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Corp.,41 the plaintiff suffered injuries while
using her thermos, manufactured by the defendant, which imploded
after she filled it with hot coffee and milk.42 The court of special appeals stated that the plaintiff needed minimal additional evidence to
establish that the defect causing the implosion either existed when the
product was purchased or soon thereafter. 43 The court permitted an
inference of a defect from the accident's occurrence, so long as other
causes of the accident were eliminated by circumstantial evidence. 44
As such, the court held that the evidence introduced was sufficient to
reasonably infer that the defect existed at the time of manufacture
and was the cause of the accident. 45
In addition, the court of appeals in Eaton Corp. v. Wrighe4 6 held that
a manufacturing defect caused an accident with little evidence prof36. Id. at 114, 117.

37. Id. at 117.
38. See, e.g., Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Corp., 61 Md. App. 23,484 A.2d 652 (1984);
Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977). For example,
the accelerator of a car sticking to the floor, and the brakes of a new vehicle
failing are instances in which very little additional evidence of a manufacturing defect would be necessary. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337,345-46,363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976).
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 23, 484 A.2d at 352.
41. 61 Md. App. 23,484 A>2d 652 (1984).
42. Id. at 25, 484 A.2d at 654.
43. /d. at 30-31,484 A.2d at 657-58. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing
that the defect existed at the time of manufacturing by a more likely than
not standard. Id. This determination was based on the testimony of the
plaintiff, which tended to eliminate the possibility that the defect was created after the thermos was purchased. Id. Generally, the lapse of time between purchase and accident is a factor in determining causation; it was not
a substantial factor in this case because the thermos was purchased three
months prior to the accident. Id.
44. Id.
45. /d.

46. 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
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fered by the plaintiff. 47 Mter being injured in an explosion using the
propane torch and fuel canister manufactured by the defendant, the
plaintiff alleged that these products were defectively manufactured. 48
On reviewing the trial court's decision on summary judgment, the
court held that, in the absence of misuse by the plaintiff, the explosion of the canister only hours after its purchase is prima facie evidence
of the defendant's strict liability.49 The court required no additional
evidence regarding the precise nature of the defect. 50
b.

DesifJ'l Defects

In defective design cases, the focus is on whether the design of the
product is defective, rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer
in designing it. 51 Because design defects cannot be determined by
reviewing the manufacture's specifications, they are predicated on a
different concept of responsibility than manufacturing defects. 52
(1)

Tests Used to Determine Design Defects

Historically, different states have employed one of two tests to determine the existence of a design defect: the "risk-utility test," the majority rule, and the "consumer-expectation" test, the minority rule.
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) adopts the reasonableness
(risk-utility balancing) test as the standard for judging design defects.
If a reasonable, alternative design would have reduced, at a reasonable cost, the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product such that
omission of the alternative design rendered the product not reasonably safe, then the risk outweighs the utility and the manufacturer is
strictly liable. Maryland decisions support this analysis. 53
47. Id. at 89, 375 A.2d at 1127.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
5l. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
53. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Nissan
Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 740 A.2d lO2 (1999); Klein v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276 (1992); Lundgren v.
Ferno-Wash. Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 565 A.2d 335 (1989); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988); C & KLord,
Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 68, 536 A.2d 699 (1988); Troja v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985); Banks v. Iron
Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984); see also Binakonsky
v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying Maryland
law); Johnson v. Int'l Harvester Co., 702 F.2d. 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Maryland law); Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115
(4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law). Accord Kelley v. RG. Indus., 304
Md. 124, 136,497 A.2d 1143, 1149-50 (1989) (stating in dicta, "[a]nother
test used to determine whether a defect exists under § 402A is the 'risk/
utility' test").
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The burden of proving a reasonable alternative design lies with the
plaintiff, however, a plaintiff is not required to actually produce a prototype in order to present a prima facie case of design defect. 54 For the
case to be submitted to the trier of fact, the plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence such that reasonable persons could conclude that
a reasonable alternative design could have been practically adopted at
the time the product was originally marketed. 55 Maryland courts already follow this approach. 56
Undertaking a risk-utility assessment by weighing the relevant advantages and disadvantages of the product's features is necessary. 57
This category of strict liability is more challenging because consumer
expectations are more difficult to discern for such defects, and setting
appropriate levels of design safety is not directly analogous to the setting of levels of quality control by a manufacturer. 58
Reference to consumer expectations is more appropriate in manufacturing defect cases because they are easier to apply than in cases
involving defects in design, warnings, or instructions. 59 Maryland case
law is somewhat inconsistent regarding the proper role of consumer
expectations in determining the existence of a design or warnings
defect. 60
The better-reasoned Maryland decisions, the general weight of authority and the Restatement (Third) do not employ a consumer-expectation test for determining defects in design, warnings, or instructions.
While what the consumer expects arguably may be one of several factors to be balanced as part of the risk-utility test, consumer expectations in and of themselves do not serve as an independent standard
for determining the existence of a defect in design, warning, or instruction. Rather, the proper test for design-defect cases is the riskutility test. 61
Maryland courts have carved out, however, a narrow subset of defects involving so-called "inherently unreasonable risks." In these
cases, the courts have found it unnecessary, as a matter of law, to even
determine whether the defect is one of manufacture or design, much
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f.
55. Id.
56. See Phipps, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955; Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. 80,
740 A.2d 102; Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 566 A.2d
135 (1989), em. denied, 318 Md. 683, 569 A.2d 1242 (1990).
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also infra notes and accompanying text 71-71.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
59. Id. § 2 cmt. g. More than any other type of defect, manufacturing defects
disappoint consumer expectations. The consumer-expectation test is more
difficult to apply in design-defect cases. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d
at 958-59.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g.
61. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the riskutility test.
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less to differentiate between the standards of proof for either type of
defect. 62 To the extent that such defects potentially involve inherently
unreasonable design defects, they may be viewed as instances in which
no reasonable person could conclude that the manufacturer's chosen
design was reasonably safe. In other words, in these rare instances,
reasonable consumer expectations as to safety so overwhelm any offsetting benefits of the design as to render it defective as a matter of
law. 63
According to the Restatement (Third), as long as the plaintiff establishes a defect under the functional criteria enumerated in section 2,
courts are free to utilize the concepts of negligence, strict liability, or
implied warranty of merchantability as theories of liability.64 Failure
to meet the requisites of section 2 will defeat a cause of action under
these other legal theories. 65
Comment n states, however, that two or more factually identical design-defect claims, or two or more factually identical failure-to-warn
claims, may not be submitted to the trier of fact under different doctrinal labels, as doing so would create general confusion and could
result in inconsistent verdicts. Both of these categories of defect involve a risk-utility assessment under sections 2(b) and 2(c), respectively, a determination that is functionally indistinguishable from
proof of negligence. Thus, for example, if a design-defect claim is
characterized as strict liability, a negligence in design claim on the
same facts should not be permitted. The same is true for claims based
on inadequate warnings. To date, Maryland courts have not demonstrated, at least not sua sponte, any inclination to curtail the pursuit of
alternative legal theories for factually identical design-defect claims, or
identical failure-to-warn claims. 66
62. Lundgren v. Ferno-Wash Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 529, 565 A.2d 335, 339
(1989) (holding that the threshold question of whether a defect involves an
inherently unreasonable risk is for the court to decide).
63. For discussion of defects involving "inherently unreasonable risks," see
supra note 53.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n.
65. [d.
66. See, e.g., Singleton v. Infl Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1981)
(applying Maryland law) (noting that because proof requirements are
greater for negligence than for strict liability, there is no need to instruct
jury concerning negligence if the evidence does not support strict liability);
Liesener v. Weslow, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 857,860 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that
strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty alleged for failure
to warn); Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 291, 336 A.2d 118,
120 (1975) (noting that negligence and breach of implied warranty alleged
for failure to warn); Blaw Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 88 Md. App.
655,667-68,596 A.2d 679, 685 (1991) (noting that strict liability and negligence alleged for design defect and failure to warn); Dechello v. Johnson
Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 n.4, eert. denied suh
nom., Albert E. Pecora Imps. v. Dechello, 312 Md. 601,541 A.2d 964 (1988)
(noting that strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty alleged for manufacturing defect and for failure to warn); Banks v. Iron Hus-
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A claim of manujacturingdefect under section 2(a), however, may be
combined with a claim of negligent manufacturing, because they rest
on different factual predicates. 67 Negligence rests on proof of fault
leading to a product defect, whereas strict liability merely requires
proof of the defect itself, not whether it arose from carelessness.
(2)

Maryland's Application of Strict Liability for Design Defects

Gen~rally,68 Maryland courts employ the risk-utility balancing test
to determine whether a design is defective. 69 To prevail, plaintiffs are
required to prove six elements: (1) the existence of an alternative design that is safer than the suspect product design; (2) the availability
of the materials necessary for production of the alternative design; (3)
the technological feasibility of manufacturing the alternative design at
the time that the product was manufactured from the suspect design;
(4) the cost of producing the alternative design; (5) the price to the
consumer resulting from the manufacturer's use of the alternative design; and (6) the chances of consumer acceptance of the alternative
design. 70

67.
68.

69.

70.

tler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 411,475 A.2d 1243, 1244 (1984) (noting that
strict liability and negligence alleged for design defect). But see, Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48
(1974) (noting that negligence theory, not strict liability theory, applies to
claim that an alleged design defect rendered motor vehicle uncrashworthy); Zieglerv. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 618,
539 A.2d 701, 704, cert. denied, 313 Md. 32, 542 A.2d 858 (1988) (declining
to address the validity, vel non, of strict liability claim, as opposed to negligence claim, for a failure to warn). Cf Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d
608,611 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that defenses based on post-sale alteration
of product are "functionally equivalent" under both strict liability and negligence causes of action).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n.
The Phipps court stated that there are some cases where design defects are
"inherently unreasonable" and do not require a balancing test. Phipps v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976). An
example of an inherently dangerous design defect is a gas pedal on a new
car that suddenly sticks, causing the vehicle to accelerate without warning.
Other examples include "a steering mechanism which causes a car to suddenly veer off the road, a drive shaft on an automobile which falls off while
the car is being operated in a safe manner, and brakes on a new automobile
which suddenfy fail." Id. at 345-46, 363 A.2d at 955.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see aLm MPJI 26:13 (explaining the
factors to be balanced: "the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability"). But see Simpson v. Standard
Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199,203-04,527 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1987) (suggesting in dicta that the "consumer expectation test" may also be applicable
in design defect cases). Cf Kelley v. RG. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 135, 497
A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (deviating from Maryland's general application of
the consumer-expectation test when considering handguns because consumers expect handguns to be dangerous as part of their normal function).
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 120,740 A.2d 102, 118 (1999).

2001]
c.

The Maryland Law of Products Liability

287

Inadequate Instructions or Warnings

Like design defects, a determination as to whether instructions or
warnings are inadequate and, thus, defective cannot be made by reviewing the manufacturer's specifications. 71 Therefore, the Restatement (Third) employs the risk-utility test to make this determination. 72
(1)

Maryland's Application of Strict Liability for Inadequate Instructions or Warnings of Product Hazards

It is well-established in Maryland law that a manufacturer may be
liable for placing a product on the market that has inadequate instructions and warnings. 73 To determine whether a warning is adequate,
Maryland has adopted the same reasonableness balancing test, also
referred to as the risk-utility balancing test, as is used in analyzing design-defect claims. 74 When determining this balance, instructions and
warnings that are too detailed may not be considered to provide a
sufficient warning. This is so because "[w]ell-meaning attempts to
warn of every possible accident lead over time to voluminous yet impenetrable labels-too prolix to read and too technical to understand."75 In addition, Maryland imposes no duty on manufacturers to
predict a consumer's violation of clear, easily understandable safety
warnings. 76
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
72. Id.
73. See Simpson, 72 Md. App. at 203, 527 A2d at 1339-40; Moran v. Faberge,
Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A2d 11, 15 (1975).
74. Moran, 273 Md. at 543, 332 A2d at 15.
75. Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Maryland law).
76. Hood, 181 F.3d at 612; see also Simpson, 72 Md. App. at 20~7, 527 A2d at
1341 (stating that "'[w]here warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is
it unreasonably dangerous'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.
j) .
In Hood v. Ryobi America Corp., the plaintiff was using an electric saw
manufactured by the defendant from which he removed the blade-guards.
Hood, 181 F.3d at 609. After using the saw without the guards for about
twenty minutes, the blade detached from the saw cutting Mr. Hood's leg
and thumb. Id. at 609-10. Although there were several warnings on both
the saw and in the owner's manual to never operate the saw without the
guards, the plaintiff alleged that there were inadequate warnings on the
saw and, thus, were defective. Id. The plaintiff thought the warnings were
to prevent objects such as clothing and fingers from coming into contact
with the blade, not that removal would cause the blade to become detached. Id. He contended that the manufacturer had the duty to state the
actual consequences of operating the saw without the guards and that the
warnings given were inadequate. Id. at 610. The court held that the manufacturer's warnings were not required to list all the consequences of improper use and that the saw was not defective because the plaintiff altered
and used the tool against the defendant's warnings. Id. In reaching this
determination, the court stated that "a clear and specific warning will nor-
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Failure-to-Warn Inconsistencies: Cause of Action and Distinction
of Claim

In Maryland, failure-to-warn cases have either proceeded as negligence causes of action or, if brought as strict liability claims, have
been rendered functionally indistinguishable from common-law negligence claims. 77 When failure-to-warn cases proceed as negligence
claims, however, the claimant need not prove the manufacturer failed
to exercise reasonable care. 78
A second issue regarding treatment of failure-to-warn claims is
whether this claim is subsumed under design defects or whether it is
an independent ground for recovery. At least one case interpreting
Maryland law has observed that '''failure to warn' liability is merely a
type of design defect. "79

mally be sufficient-the manufacturer need not warn of every mishap or
source of injury that the mind can imagine flowing from the product." Id.
(quoting Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D. Md. 1991».
77. See, e.g., Higgins v. Diversey Corp., 998 F. Supp 598, 604 (D. Md. 1997)
(referencing the "strong resemblance" and common elements of negligence and strict liability for failure to warn under Maryland law); Liesener,
775 F. Supp. at 860 ("There is persuasive authority that the duty to warn in
Maryland is essentially identical under the V.C.C. [for breach of implied
warranty], the law of negligence, and the law of strict liability, i.e., there is a
duty to provide a reasonable warning of latent defects . . . . There is, of
course, no duty to warn of obvious dangers .... "); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435, 601 A.2d 633, 640 (1992) ("[I]n a failure to
warn case governed by the Restatement § 402A and Commentj, negligence
concepts to some extent have been grafted onto strict liability."); Mazda
Motor of Am. v. Rogowski, 105 Md. App. 318, 325, 659 A.2d 391, 394 (1995)
(noting the "strong resemblance" and common elements of negligence and
strict liability for failure to warn); Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 84 Md. App.
397,410,579 A.2d 1191, 1198 (1990) ("The distinction between negligence
and strict liability lessens considerably in failure to warn cases." (citing Werner v. Vpjohn Co., 628 F.2d. 848 (4th Cir. 1980»). See also Lohrmann v.
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d. 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying
Maryland law) (including references to "reasonableness" at the time of
manufacture in jury charge concerning strict liability for failure to warn was
not in error); MPJI 26:3 (classifYing a manufacturer's failure to fulfill its
duty to give an adequate warning as "negligence"). There also is significant
overlap between strict liability of a failure to warn and a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability for the same failure to warn. Dechello v.
Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 n.4 (1988).
78. Singleton v. Int'l Harvestor Co., 685 F.2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying
Maryland law) ("The sole difference between liability for negligence and
strict liability [for a failure to warn] is that the plaintiff in proving negligence must prove not only that the product was unreasonably dangerous
but also that the failure to warn was the result of the defendant's failure to
use due care.").
79. Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713, 718 (D. Md. 1996) (citing
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988».
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Defenses to Strict Liability Claims in Maryland

Maryland courts recognize several defenses in an action based on
strict liability in tort. 80 A manufacturer is not liable where injury results from the user's abnormal handling or use of the product. 81 Nor
is the seller liable when the product is delivered in a safe condition
but is subsequently mishandled. 82 In addition, if adequate warnings
and instructions are supplied but are disregarded by the consumer,
liability will not be imposed. 83 Finally, a manufacturer may also defend under the consumer's assumption of the risk. 84

3.

Section 3: Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
.
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff
was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or
distribution, without proof of the specific nature of the defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of
causes other than product defect existing at the time
of sale or distribution. 85

Section 3 is rooted in the negligence concept of res ipsa loquitur"the thing speaks for itself.,,86 As products liability law developed,
cases arose in which an inference of defect could be drawn from the
incident itself, without proof of the precise nature of the defect. More
often than not, such cases arose in the context of manufacturing defects, typically evidenced by a product malfunction. The rule is not,
however, restricted to manufacturing defects alone.
Comment b to section 3 emphasizes the difference between a general inference of defect under section 3 and claims of defect brought
directly under sections 1 and 2: "Section 3 claims are limited to situations where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function, thus supporting the conclusion that a defect of some kind is the
most probable explanation."87
80. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958-59
(1976).
81. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. h. A seller is not liable for a
child who becomes ill from eating too much candy. Id. Similarly, a manufacturer is not liable for mishandling when a bottled beverage is kicked
over and the cap is removed. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g.
83. Id. § 402A cmt. j.
84. Id .§ 402A cmt. n. Assumption of the risk applies where "a consumer unreasonably proceeds to use a product despite its known risk or danger. " Id.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3.
86. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1311 (7th ed. 1999).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. B.
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Maryland allows circumstantial evidence to prove a defect in a products liability action in appropriate circumstances. 88 A plaintiff filing a
products liability suit in Maryland has the burden of establishing that
it is more probable than not that the defect in the product existed
when the product was sold. 89 If this cannot be proven by direct evidence, the plaintiff can introduce circumstantial evidence from which
an inference of a product defect can be drawn. 90 Proof of a defect,
88. Compare Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Servo Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 31, 484 A.2d
652, 656 (1984) (establishing defect without expert testimony "when a
product [such as an imploding thermos bottle] fails to meet the reasonable
expectations of the user, the inference is that there was some sort of defect,
a precise definition of which is unnecessary") and Eaton Corp. V. Wright,
281 Md. 80, 89, 375 A.2d 1122,1127 (1977) ("There can be little doubt that
a propane canister, used immediately after purchase according to instructions on the label, which continues to allow gas to be released after an
appliance has been removed, is defective and unreasonably dangerous ....
There was no necessity for [plaintiffs] to show more concerning the precise
nature of the defect.") with Jensen V. Am. Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226,
229,437 A.2d 242, 244 (1981) (preventing inference of defect where plaintiff did not present evidence negating other causes of an accident and stating "[t]he bare fact that an accident happens to a product ... is usually not
sufficient proof that it was in any way defective.").
89. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 32, 484 A.2d at 657. For the elements of a products
liability claim filed under Maryland law, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
90. See Harrison V. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50, 549 A.2d 385, 390
(1988). In Harrison, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action against
the manufacturer and seller of a used car to recover damages caused by a
fire within or behind the instrument panel of their 1978 Mercury Zephyr,
which plaintiffs purchased "used" in 1982 with nearly 59,000 miles on the
odometer. Id. at 43, 549 A.2d at 386. Shortly after purchasing the fouryear-old car, the Harrison's returned it to the seller, complaining that the
tires were bald and it smelled of mildew. Id. at 43-44, 549 A.2d at 387. The
tires were replaced, and the sales staff told the Harrison's that the smell
would go away. Id. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. Less than one year later, a fire
ignited behind the instrument panel on the dashboard while Ms. Harrison
was driving the car. Id. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. She was injured when she
escaped from the vehicle just prior to it colliding with a tree. Id. The plaintiffs asserted a breach of implied warranty and strict liability against the
manufacturer. Id. at 50, 549 A.2d at 390. One of the plaintiffs' experts
testified that "[c]ars shouldn't catch on fire going down the road," but
could not determine what defect, if any, existed. Id. at 51,549 A.2d at 390.
A second expert concluded that the fire was caused by an electrical short
but was unable to give any indication that the short was caused by a defect
in the automobile that existed at the time of the sale of the car in 1978. Id.
In upholding the lower court's decision, granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, the appellate court focused on the weakness of
plaintiffs' evidence. Id. at 52, 549 A.2d at 391. The court emphasized this
point, "[The appellants] have been unable to show that what might possibly
have happened did probably happen .... [B]ecause a one-car accident
happened without apparent cause, the manufacturer must be to blame.
Such a theory is not supported by established principles of [products liability]. It is simply wishful thinking." Id. at 54,549 A.2d at 392 (quotingJensen,
50 Md. App. at 234-35, 437 A.2d at 247). Thus, the court concluded that a
reasonable fact-finder would not be able to draw an inference that the
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however, must rise above conjecture or speculation, and may not rest
on a presumption that a defect exists based on the mere happening of
the accident. 91 This method of proving a product defect has been
referred to as the "indeterminate defect theory."92
Generally, an inference of a defect may be drawn where the circumstantial evidence tends to eliminate other possible causes, such as
product misuse or alteration. 93 In determining whether a product defect may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, Maryland courts
consider at least five factors: (1) expert testimony as to possible
causes; (2) if the accident occurred shortly after the sale of the product in a "new" condition; (3) whether the same accident occurred in
similar products; (4) the elimination of other causes of the accident;
and (5) whether the type of accident is one that occurs without a
defect. 94
.
Expert testimony is only required when the subject of the inference
is so particularly related to a science or profession that it is beyond the
understanding of the average layperson. 95 Expert testimony was not
required on the issue of whether a product warning "gets its message
across to an average person."96 As discussed in Virgil v. Kash N' Kany
Service Corp.,97 no expert testimony was given to support why the plaintiff's three-month-old thermos imploded after she poured hot coffee
into it. 98 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated:
Expert testimony is hardly necessary to establish that a thermos bottle that explodes or implodes when coffee and milk
are poured into it is defective. When a product fails to meet
the reasonable expectation of the user, "the inference is that
there was some sort of a defect, a precise definition of which
is unnecessary."99

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

product was defective at the time it was manufactured. [d. at 53, 549 A.2d
at 391.
jensen, 50 Md. App. at 232, 437 A.2d at 242.
Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., 2000 WL 1690183, at *2 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying
Maryland law).
Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 51,549 A.2d at 390.
[d.; see also PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 103 at 673-74 (4th ed. 1971).
Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656.
Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1243, 1304 (D.D.C. 1982)
("The Court can think of no question more appropriately left to a common
sense lay judgment than that of whether a written warning gets its message
across to an average person.").
See supra notes 40-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Virgil.
Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654.
[d. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656 (quoting Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806
(Or. 1967)).
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Thus, the appellant's testimonylOO regarding her purchase of the thermos and her subsequent use of the product gave rise to a reasonable
inference that the thermos was defective when she acquired it. 101
Although Maryland has not yet had occasion to consider adoption
of the Restatement (Third), the Fourth Circuit used the principles enunciated therein in an unpublished decision applying Maryland law,
Riley v. De'Longhi Corp.102 In Riley, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer
of a six-month-old portable heater that had been used only three
times, alleging that a defect in it ignited a fire in their home. 103 The
plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the most probable cause of the
fire was a failure inside the heater. 104 The defendant challenged that
this testimony did not suffice as expert testimony as to possible
causes 105 because the expert "failed to identifY a precise defect within
the heater."106 The court, relying on section 3, comment c of the Restatement (Third), stated that the expert's inability to identifY a precise
defect was not fatal to the plaintiffs' case because, in a circumstantial
case,107 the "plaintiff need not explain specifically what constituent
part of the product failed. "108 Thus, it appears that the Fourth Circuit
has made an initial step in accepting the concept of inferential evidence of product defects set forth in section 3 of the Restatement
(Third).
4.

Section 4: Noncompliance and Compliance with Product Safety
Statutes or Regulations

In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the
100. Mrs. Virgil testified that she had bought the thermos several months prior
to the implosion and denied dropping it or misusing, abusing, or damaging
it in any way. Id. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654.
.
101. Id. at 33, 484 A.2d at 657.
102. Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., 2000 WL 1690183, at *2 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying
Maryland law).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs' expert contended that the fire was caused by an
electrical malfunction within the heater's control panel and its attached
wiring. Id.
105. This issue raised by the defendant-manufacturer goes to the first element in
determining whether a product defect may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence as set forth in Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50,
549 A.2d 385, 390 (1998). See supra text accompanying note 94 for five
factors set forth in Harrison.
106. Riley, 2000 WL 1690183, at *3.
107. The court reasoned that the use of circumstantial proof of defect was appropriate in this case because the heater sustained such severe damage that
"direct evidence may not be available." Id. at *2 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 3 cmt. b).
108. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. c).
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product defective with respect to the risks sought to be
reduced by the statute or regulation; and
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation is properly
considered in determining whether a product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by
the statute or regulation, but such compliance does
not preclude as a matter of law a rmding of product
defect. 109

a.

Noncompliance with a Safety Statute or Regulation

Section 4(a) provides that a design defect or a warnings defect necessarily exists if there has been a violation of an applicable safety statute or regulation.
There is no reported Maryland appellate court decision addressing
whether there is a design defect or warning defect per se if the manufacturer has violated an applicable safety statute. The Maryland cases
to date dealing with violation of safety statutes have been in the context of negligence causes of action, and even then not in cases involving the sale of a product. llo Under longstanding general negligence
precedents in Maryland, however, violation of a statute is not negligence per se, but rather "some evidence" of negligence if three requirements are met. Ill First, the plaintiff must be a member of the class
the statute was designed to protect; second, the injury suffered must
be of the type the statute was designed to prevent; and third, the violation must be a proximate cause of the injuryY2
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4.
110. In Hammond v. Robins, the plaintiffs were injured when a dog ran in front of
the heavy duty tandem bicycle they were riding, causing them to swerve and
the bike to topple. Hammond v. Robins, 60 Md. App. 430, 433, 483 A.2d
379, 380 (1984). The defendant and owner of the dog had not complied
with the Carroll County Code requiring dogs be kept under restraint. [d. at
435, 483 A.2d at 381. The court acknowledged that violation of a statutory
duty establishes a prima facie case of negligence only where the violation is
the proximate cause of the accident or injury. [d. The court clarified, however, that such a violation does not constitute negligence per se. [d. See also
infra note III for a discussion of a similar case.
111. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 362, 517 A.2d 1122,1132
(1986). In Pahanish, the plaintiff sued the operator of a horse stable for
negligence after being injured on one its trails. [d. at 348, 517 A.2d at 1125.
The plaintiff claimed that the lower court erred in failing to find that the
owner's violation of certain statutory licensing and inspection stipulations
established a prima facie case of negligence. [d. at 361, 517 A.2d at 1132.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that the violation of a
statute does not constitute negligence per se, rather it may be considered
evidence of negligence so long as three requirements were met. [d. at 362,
517 A.2d at 1132; see also infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three requirements for a prima facie case of negligence based
on the violation of a statutory duty.
112. Pahanish, 69 Md. App. at 362, 517 A.2d at 1132; see also MPJI 19:7.
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It is unclear whether Maryland courts would conclude that a violation of an applicable safety statute or regulation constitutes conclusive
proof of the existence of a defect, as opposed to mere evidence of a
possible defect. The Reporter's Note in section 4 of the Restatement
(Third) states that common-law negligence principles in some states,
such as Maryland, treat a violation of an applicable safety statute or
regulation as mere evidence, but not conclusive proof, of negligenceY3 The Restatement (Third), however, subscribes to the rule of
"the overwhelming majority of American courts"1l4 that, in cases involving both design and failure to warn, violations of product safety
regulations cause products to be defective as a matter of lawY5

b.

Compliance with a Safety Statute or Regulation

Maryland law is generally in accord with the principle enunciated in
section 4(b), which states that compliance with statutes or regulations
governing product designs or warnings does not preclude, as a matter
of law, a finding of product defect. Maryland provides, however, that
such a legal preclusion of defectiveness may arise in some circumstancesY6 For example, in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,1l7 the
plaintiff was wearing a flannel nightgown inside-out when it ignited
after she was standing near the front burner of her electric stove. I IS
She was severely burned as a resultY9 In her products liability suit
against the fabric manufacturer, the trial judge refused to admit evidence of the Flammable Fabrics Act. 120 In holding the evidence admissible, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that although
compliance with a statutory standard suggests due care, it does not
preclude a finding of negligence due to failure to take additional pre113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. d, rptr. n.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005
(1993); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348
(1985); see almTroja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 116,488
A.2d 516, 523 (1985) (holding that harmless error occurred when expert
testimony by defendant was admitted after plaintiff introduced that the
product was in compliance with statues, regulations, and industry practices). Cf Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D. Md. 1991) (following accepted industry standards, even if counsel has urged a more cautious
approach, is not reckless conduct for a manufacturer to follow).
117. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985).
118. Id. at 586, 495 A.2d at 350.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 602, 495 A.2d at 359. Although the manufacturer exceeded the requirements imposed by statute, plaintiff wished to introduce evidence that
the "incidence and severity of burns caused by ignition of clothing that was
subject to the Federal standard" in an attempt to overcome the inference
that clothing manufactured in compliance with the standard was not unreasonably dangerous. Id.
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cautions. 121 The court asserted that this rule was similar in strict liability cases, where proof of compliance with a product statutory standard
does not prevent a judgment of defectiveness. 122
Similarly, in Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc.,123 a tort action against
three corporate defendants responsible for designing, manufacturing,
and selling an automobile "Lift Kit" device installed on an automobile
that was later involved in a two-car collision, the court asserted that
compliance with a statute does not necessarily preclude a finding of
negligence or product defectiveness where a reasonable person would
take precautions beyond the statutorily required measure. 124 The
court expanded their holding beyond the principle of section 4(b),
however, declaring that a legal preclusion of defectiveness as a matter
of law may arise from compliance in some circumstances. 125 Mter reviewing evidence that the defendants complied with standards of the
Transportation Article regarding vehicle bumper heights, the court
held that "where no special circumstances require extra caution, a
court may find that conformity to the statutory standard amounts to
due care as a matter of law."126 Thus, while Maryland law is in accord
with the general principle set forth in section 4(b), if there are no
special circumstances requiring additional caution, then a court may
hold that statutory compliance indicates due care or lack of defectiveness as a matter of law.
B.

Liability Rules Applicable to Special Products or Product Markets

1.

Section 5: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product
Components for Harm Caused by Products into Which Components are Integrated
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by a product into which the component is integrated
if:
(a) the component is defective in itself, as dermed in this
Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and

121.
122.
123.
124.

[d. at 602, 495 A.2d at 358.
[d.
330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993).
[d. at 729,743,625 A.2d at 1007, 1014 ("Our cases recognize, however, that
compliance with a statute does not necessarily preclude a finding of negligence or product defectiveness where a reasonable person would take precautions beyond the statutorily required measure.").
125. [d. at 743-44, 625 A.2d at 1014.
126. [d.

296

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective, as def'med in this Chapter; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm. 127
Section 5 is founded on the fundamental policy that component
sellers should not be liable when the component itself is not defective.
Subsection (b) sets forth a three-prong test that plaintiffs must meet
before holding a component-part manufacturer strictly liable for participating in the design of the integrated product. 128
Although there are no reported Maryland decisions on this topic,
the policy underlying section 5(a) is consistent with Maryland's general approach to products liability law. Maryland courts impose liability only on those in the distribution chain who either caused or at least
are in a position to reasonably detect the defect that caused the
harm. 129
Maryland case law and the Restatement (Second), however, are less instructive regarding section 5 (b). Although there is no fully comparable section to 5(b), section 395 in the Restatement (Second/ 30 addresses
the liability of component-part manufacturers but not a comparable
standard for substantial participation. 131
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5.
128. Id. § 5(b) (1)-(3).
129. See, e.~ Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 549 A.2d 385
(1988); see supra note 90 for a more detailed description of the facts of
Harrison. The Harrisons initiated a products liability action against the car
dealership to recover damages after the used car they bought from the defendant caught fire. Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. The
court held that dealers of used products should not, in most instances, be
held strictly liable for defects created by the manufacturer of a product sold
in a used condition by the dealer. Id. at 55-56, 549 A.2d at 392-93. In dicta,
the Hamson court suggested that the liability of a dealer of used products
should be limited to defects created in the product by the dealer, or perhaps to situations where the dealer knew or should have known of the existence of the manufacturing defect. Id. at 55, 549 A.2d at 392.
130. Section 395 of the Restatement (Second), entitled "Negligent Manufacture of
Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully Made" states:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should
expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be
endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is supplied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 395.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 395 rptr. n. Reporter's Note m, titled "Manufacturer of raw material or parts of article to be assembled by a third person" states in part: "A manufacturer of parts to be incorporated in the
product of his buyer or others is subject to liability under the Section if they
are so negligently made as to render the products in which they are incorporated unreasonably dangerous for use." Id.
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Maryland courts have not interpreted section 395 of the Restatement
(Second) regarding liability of component product manufacturers for
harm caused by the products into which the components are integrated. Thus, there is no indication what the trend in Maryland might
be. Decisions of other courts are instructive of how Maryland courts
may treat the issues associated with section 5 (b) of the Restatement
(Third). 132
2.

Section 6: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm
Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug
or medical device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or
medical device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant to a health-care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or medical device is defective if at the
time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical
device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as dermed in Section 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as
dermed in Subsection (c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as dermed in Subsection (d).
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would not prescribe the drug or medical device for
any class of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if

132. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Lit., 996 F. Supp.
1110,1116-17 (D. Ala. 1997) (stating that technical service assistance and
advice provided by component manufacturer did not constitute such substantial participation in the design of the integrated products as would subject a component manufacturer to potential liability if those products were
shown to be defective); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712,716
(R.I. 1999) (adopting the Restatement (Third) approach that the manufacturer or seller of a component part may be liable to the ultimate user, particularly if it substantially partiCipated in the integration of the component
into the design of the final product).
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reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(I) prescribing and other health-care providers who
are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health-care providers will not
be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription
drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm
caused by the drug or device if: (1) at the time of sale
or other distribution the drug or medical device contains a manufacturing defect as dermed in Section
2(a); or (2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical device the retail seller
or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care
and such failure causes harm to persons. 133
Prescription drugs and medical devices entail weighing unique risks
and benefits-what may be.harmful to one patient may be beneficial
to another. Section 6(a) of the Restatement (Third) is the general provision imposing liability on the manufacturer of a defective prescription
drug or medical device. 134
The following three subsections refine when liability for a defect is
to be imposed on a manufacturer of a prescribed drug or medical
device. Such a product is defective if, at the time of its distribution, it:
(1) deviates from its intended design, despite using all possible
care;135 (2) is created from a defective design making it unreasonably
safe, such that the foreseeable harm is sufficiently great in comparison
to its foreseeable benefit that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients;l36 or (3)
fails to adequately warn or instruct its users, which occurs when reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm
are not provided to either (a) health-care providers in a position to
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6.
134. Id. § 6(a).
135. Id. § 6(b) (1).
136. Id. § 6(b)(2), (c). Because of the special nature of prescription drugs and
medical devices, section 6(c) provides a special standard for determining
their design-defect liability rather than the more general test for design
defect under section 2(b). REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b. See supra text
accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2(b). See also supra notes 5151 and accompanying text for a discussion of design defects. Under section
6(c), a prescription drug or medical device is defectively designed only
when it provides no net benefit to any class of patients. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) !:i 6 cmt. b.
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reduce the risks of harm,137 or (b) to the patient, when the manufacturer has reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a
position to reduce the risk of harm. 138
The last subsection of section 6 imposes liability on the retailer or
other distributor of a defective, prescription drug or medical device.
Section 6(e) provides that a retailer or other distributor of a prescription drug or device that causes harm may be liable if it contains a
manufacturing defect139 when it is distributed 140 or if, at or before
distribution, the retailer or distributor fails to exercise reasonable
care, causing injury to others. 141
Maryland has not had the opportunity to consider defective prescription drug or medical devices cases that would implicate section 6
of the REstatement (Third). Drawing analogies to similar products liability cases and reviewing the approaches taken by other jurisdictions,
however, leads to a better understanding of whether Maryland courts
will adopt section 6.
a.

Manufacturer's Liability for Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices with
Manufacturing Defects

There are no Maryland cases addressing the liability of a manufacturer of a defectively manufactured prescription drug or medical
device.
b.

Manufacturer's Liability for Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices with
Design Defects

Although there are no Maryland appellate decisions on point, other
jurisdictions traditionally have refused imposing tort liability for defective design of prescription drugs and medical devices. 142 The objective
standard to show defective design under section 6(b)(2) is "very demanding;" liability is imposed "only under unusual circumstances."143
Decisions refusing to impose strict liability for design defects of prescription drugs or medical devices are rooted in the "unavoidably un137. [d. § 6(b)(3), (d)(I).
138. [d. § 6(b)(3), (d)(2).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a) (defining the manufacturing defect). See
supra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2(a). See also supra
notes 17-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of manufacturing defects, generally under section 2(a). See supra notes 20-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland's adoption of application of strict
liability for a manufactUring defect. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland plaintiffs' burden to prove defect, attribution, and causation. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Maryland's reconsideration of degree and lessening of the
evidence necessary for plaintiffs to recover for a manufacturing defect.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) S 6(e) (1).
141. [d. § 6(e)(2).
142. [d. § 6 cmt. b.
143. [d. § 6 cmt. f.
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safe product" exception in the Restatement (Second).144 To determine
whether a drug or product is considered unavoidably unsafe, two approaches have developed. One is to insulate all prescription drugs
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .145 The second is to determine eligibility for immunity on an individual basis,
looking at the drug and the circumstances. 146
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. k. Comment k states:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably
leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this
very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such
products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id. Maryland expressly adopted comment k in Miles Lab. Inc. v. Doe, 315
Md. 704, 732-33, 556 A.2d 1107, 1121 (1989) (certifying that Maryland implicitly adopted comment k in Phipps, and permitted recovery from the
commercial preparer and supplier of a blood product based on strict liability in tort, where, assertedly as a result of receipt of the blood product, the
recipient was infected with the AIDS virus).
145. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
146. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labs., 112 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987). This approach
is problematic because jurors may challenge the FDA's approval of the drug
by deciding whether it would have been reasonable to prescribe the drug or
device to any class of patients. If they determine that it would not be, then
they will have concluded, in effect, that the product should not have been
marketed at all. This determination contradicts the FDA's finding, which is
made after thorough risk-benefit analysis. Given this complication, courts
applying this approach have determined that a judge is to make the determination of whether comment k immunity is applicable to a particular defendant and that determination is to be made at an evidentiary hearing
outside of the presence of the jury. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
718 P.2d 1318, 1326-27 (Kan. 1986) (determining that trial judge should
have heard evidence on issue outside presence of jury and made ruling
thereon); Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (excepting drug from strict liability design-defect analysis can only be
made after evidence is taken out of jury's presence and relevant factors
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The design-defect standard focuses on the drug or device at issue,
not on other experimental or approved products that an expert witness believes are safer or reasonable alternatives. 147 As such, a drug or
device is not defective simply because an alternative product is said to
present fewer risks.
c.

Manufacturer's Liability for Inadequately Instructing or Warning About
Risks Associated with Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices

The traditional "learned intermediary" rule, requiring the manufacturer to warn the prescribing health-care provider, rather than the
patient, about risks attendant to the use of prescription drugs and
medical devices, is embodied in section 6. 148 Section 6(d), however,
also recognizes that, in some limited circumstances, the manufacturer
has a duty to warn the patient directly, rather than the health-care
provider. 149
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not expressly addressed
whether Maryland should adopt the learned intermediary doctrine in
a strict liability case. 150 In Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., however,
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland saw no
reason to conclude that Maryland courts would not adopt the
doctrine. 151
In Fellows, the plaintiff alleged that USV Pharmaceutical Corp.
("USV'), a drug manufacturer, was strictly liable for injuries suffered
from the side effects of taking Doriden, a drug prescribed for insomnia. 152 Upon granting USVs summary judgment motion,153 the court
stated:
Although the Maryland courts have not yet addressed the effect of comment k on section 402A, this court has been
presented with no evidence suggesting that they would not
follow the approach of other courts that have decided the
issue. These and numerous other cases have held that pre-

147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.
153.

considered). Another court has determined that whether a product is immune from liability under comment k is a question for the judge if reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb &
Co., 546 A.2d 775, 783 (R.I. 1988).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(b) (1).
Id. § 6(d) (1); see also id. § 6(b) (3); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,
1245 (NJ. 1999) (defining learned intermediary doctrine).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d)(2); see also id. § 6(b)(3), cmt. b.
Cf Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 522-23, 276 A.2d 36, 40 (1971) (implicitly
creating the learned intermediary doctrine in Maryland in a case decided
before Maryland adopted Restatement (Second) section 402A strict liability
principles); Miller v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (D.
Md. 2000) (acknowledging Maryland's recognition of the learned intermediary doctrine).
502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 301.
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scription drugs are not considered unusually dangerous
under section 402A, and the manufacturer will not incur liability under that section unless the manufacturer has failed
to provide adequate warnings of the drug's possible dangers.
The audience to whom these warnings must be directed is
the medical community, not the consuming public. Since
there is no dispute regarding the adequacy of USV's warnings to the medical community, as well as to [the prescribing
physician], USV is not liable to plaintiff under section 402A
as a matter of law. 154
In Werner v. Upjohn CO.,155 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit stated that it was adequate for a drug manufacturer
to avoid liability for marketing a new drug that, although beneficial,
was unavoidably dangerous if a warning was included regarding the
drug's known side effects. 156 The court stated:
Any remaining distinction in theories [between negligence
and strict liability] disappears when a failure to warn case involves an unavoidably dangerous drug which the product in
this case admittedly was. The Restatement of Torts (Second)
[section] 402A, comment k makes it clear that a drug manufacturer is not to be held strictly liable for injuries caused by
an unavoidably dangerous new drug if the warning is adequate. The standard for liability under strict liability and
negligence is essentially the same. 157
154. Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
155. 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland law and comment k
of the Restatement (Second) section 402A). The plaintiff, Jack Werner,
brought this action to recover damages for injuries received from taking
Cleocin, a prescribed broad-spectrum antibiotic manufactured by Upjohn.
Id. at 851. Cleocin was approved by the FDA for general use in 1970, and
was popular for persons allergic to penicillin. Id. After use of the drug
increased, Upjohn received reports of side effects such as diarrhea and colitis, which were reported to the FDA, and resulted in studies performed
independently and in-house by Upjohn. Id. As a result of the studies, the
warnings associated with the drug were frequently revised, and in 1974, a
letter was mailed to every physician in the United States warning physicians
of the side effects' of the drug and recommended treatment if they arise.
Id. at 852. The warning stated, in part: "severe and persistent diarrhea,
which may be accompanied by blood and mucus, and which may be associated with changes in large bowel mucosa diagnosed as 'pseudomembranous colitis,' has been reported in association of Cleocin HCI (clindamycin
HCI hydrate)." Id. It further stated warning signs, and recommended
treatment if the warning signs occur. Id. Upjohn updated the warning
again in 1975, which expanded upon the earlier version and recommended
that Cleocin be "reserved for serious infections where less toxic antimicrobial agents are inappropriate." Id. at 853. The warning also stated side
effects, other limitations on prescribing the drug, proposed treatment if the
side effects manifest, and other drugs that may prolong or worsen the condition. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 858.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court is the only court to date that has
adopted section 6(d)(2) of the Restatement (Third). In Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories Inc.,15S the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
learned intermediary doctrine I59 does not apply to direct marketing
of prescription drugs to consumers.160 It is appropriate to impose a
duty on the manufacturer to warn the patient directly because situations may exist when the health-care provider assumes a "much-diminished role as an evaluator or decision maker."16I Thus, under the
Restatement (Third), "warnings may have to be provided to a health-care
provider or even to the patient," depending on the circumstances. 162
d.

Liability of Retailer or Distributor of Prescribed Drug or Medical Device for
Harm Caused by Defect Existing Before or After the Sale

Maryland courts have not addressed a case with facts to which section 6(e) would apply. Analogies can be drawn, however, from Maryland's current treatment of retailers.
Normally, a retailer is a "conduit" between the manufacturer and
the customer; the seller "ordinarily has no duty in negligence to discover the defects or dangers of a particular product."163 Where the
seller is more than a mere "conduit," however, a supplier-installer defendant may be liable because he "should have known" of the products dangers. 164 Generally, ordinary retailers are protected because
the responsibility of detecting potential defects would be too onerous
a task. 165 Retail vendors of prescription drugs and medical devices,
however, must exercise reasonable care, which includes following
manufacturers' warnings and relaying those warnings to their custom158. 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). This case was a consolidated action in Middlesex County, New Jersey with twenty-five Norplant cases involving approximately fifty Norplant users. Id. at 1248.
159. See supra text accompanying note 148 for a definition of the learned intermediary doctrine.
160. Perez., 734 A.2d at 1257.
161. Id. at 1253.
162. [d.
163. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 326 Md.179, 202, 604 A.2d 445, 455 (1992).
164. [d. at 198-99, 604 A.2d at 454-56. "Reason to know" and "should know" are
terms of art in the Restatement (Second). "Reason to know" means that the
actor of reasonable intelligence would infer that a defect, in fact, exists
(strict liability). "Should know" means that the actor of reasonable intelligence would discover the defect in the course of his ordinary duty, in light
of his peculiar experience dealing with such products (negligence). See id.
at 20~4, 604 A.2d at 457. Defendants properly exercising their ordinary
duty to inspect are not liable under a "should have known" negligence standard. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305
(1965) (holding that liability could only be imposed on defendant-car
dealer if defect could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305-06, 336 A.2d
118, 128 (1975) (same).
165. See Frericks, 274 Md. at 305, 336 A.2d at 128.
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ers/patients. Given the disparity in financial resources of pharmacies
and medical suppliers, from the super-store to the corner store, it
would be unfair to impose strict liability upon retailers when the manufacturers' resources are more abundant. 166

3.

Section 7: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm
Caused by Defective Food Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing food products who sells or distributes a food product
that is defective under § 2, § 3, or § 4 is subject to liability
for hann to persons or property caused by the defect.
Under § 2(a), a hann-causing ingredient of the food product
constitutes a defect if a reasonable consumer would not expect the food product to contain that ingredient. 167

Section 7 provides that liability for harm caused by defective, commercially distributed food products should be determined under the
same rules generally applicable to non-food products. For example,
the presence of a foreign object in food, such as a pebble in a can of
peas, may readily be handled as a manufacturing defect under section
2(a). Food product cases, however, may also present unique questions of whether food is defective where the foreign matter that
caused the harm naturally occurs in the thing being consumed, such
as a shell in a crabcake or a blood vessel in a chicken wing. To resolve
this indeterminacy, section 7 adopts the majority rule that applies a
reasonable consumer-expectation test for purposes of determining
whether a manufacturing defect exists under section 2(a).168
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, predicting that Maryland appellate courts would impose liability on the
food distributor, has applied a reasonable consumer-expectation test
to determine whether the defect in the food fell below reasonable
consumer expectations. 169

166. Id. The Maryland General Assembly has codified the principle in section 5311 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code,
the purpose of which "is to make the chickens of poor design come home
to roost with the manufacturer, not the retailer." Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F.
Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1991); MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 53ll(b) (1989).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 7.
168. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
169. Id.; Yang Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D. Md.
1987).
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The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ImposesReasonable Expectation

In Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott COrp.,170 the court addressed whether
the manufacturer and seller were liable for defects in the manufacture
of food products, manifested by harm caused by the presence of an
ingredient not intended by the product seller. l71 The suit arose when
the plaintiff, while eating a fried chicken wing, bit into what she perceived to be a worm, which was actually either the chicken's trachea or
a major blood vesseI,172 The plaintiff sued Marriott Corp., the proprietor of the restaurant, and Gold Kist, the store's chicken supplier, for
negligence and breach of warranty.173 Defending against plaintiffs
summary judgment motion, the proprietor and supplier contended
that breach of warranty only occurs if the offending item was a "foreign object," not part of the chicken itself. 174
Mter reviewing the law in other jurisdictions, the statement of law
in the Uniform Commercial Code hornbook, and the characteristics
of fried chicken,175 the court concluded that when the item discovered in the food object is a natural item that could be "reasonably
170. 656 F. Supp. 445 (D. Md. 1987).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 447. Based on the Strasburger and Siegel Certificate of Analysis introduced into evidence it could have been the aorta. /d.
173. Id. at 446. Strict liability was not alleged in Yang Cha Hong. Under the
functional defect principles enunciated in the Restatement (Third), however,
the legal theory on which the claimant proceeds would have no bearing on
the test to be used for determining whether a defect existed. An injured
person was formerly precluded from bringing a breach of warranty claim
against a restaurant owner under implied warranty that its food is of merchantable quality and fit for human consumption. See Child's Dining Hall
Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 493, 197 A. 105, 106 (1938) (recovering from
injuries from eating bread containing tin at defendant's restaurant precluded unless negligence shown, as supplying food in a restaurant is service, where there is no implied warranty). Section 2-314(2) of the
Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code supercedes this holding,
whereby the "U[niform] C[ommercial] C[ode] warranty of merchantability
applies to sales of food in restaurants, including take-out sales." Yang Cha
Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447 n. 3 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw § 2314(2) (1975».
174. Yang Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447. Section 7 of the Restatement (Third)
examines the difficulty of food product cases when it is unclear whether the
ingredient that caused the plaintiff's harm is truly a manufacturing defect
or is an inherent aspect of the product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) !§ 7 cmt.
b. The Restatement claims that this problem stems from the fact that food
products usually do not have "specific product designs that may be used as
a basis for determining whether the offending product ingredient constitutes a departure from design, and is thus a manufacturing defect." Id. In
order to resolve this problem, some courts have relied on a distinction between "foreign" and "natural" characteristics of food products to determine
liability. Id. Under this test, a commercial seller or distributor is only liable
for harm-causing foreign objects in the food product.
175. Yang Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447-49.
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expected in the dish by its very nature under the prevailing expectation of the reasonable consumer,"176 then the dish is merchantable
and the plain tiff' s recovery is denied. I77 In many jurisdictions, this
standard, known as the "reasonable expectation" test, has displaced
the natural/foreign distinction proffered by the defendants. I7s
Considering the foregoing, as well as a previous Court of Appeals of
Maryland opinion,I79 the federal district court was "confident that Maryland would apply the 'reasonable expectation' rule to this warranty
case .... "ISO Because the presence of a trachea or large aorta in fastfood fried chicken was not clearly reasonably expected to render it
merchantable as a matter of law, the court denied the defendant's
summary judgment motion in order to allow a jury to determine the
issue. lSI

b.

Court of Appeals of Maryland's Predecessor to Yong Cha Hong

In Bryer v. Bath Packing CO.,IS2 a girl was injured by eating a small
chicken bone found in chow me in at the school cafeteria with chicken
from "Ready to Serve Boned Chicken"Is3 in sealed, packaged cans. IS4
The court stated, "warranty is one of merchantable quality or fitness
for the general purpose for which the goods are sold which, in food
cases, means reasonably fit and safe for human consumption."IS5 Because the canned chicken was purported to be boneless, and, given
that chow mein would be difficult to guard against bones, the court
held that the trier of fact would likely find that chicken bones in the
chow mein were "something that should not be there."IS6
4.

Section 8: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Defective Used Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing used products who sells or distributes a defective used
product is subject to liability for hann to persons or property
caused by the defect if the defect:

176.
177.
178.
179.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 448. This standard is the "reasonable expectation" test.
Id.
Id.
Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 113, 156 A.2d 442, 447 (1959)
(recognizing negligence claim for "something that should not be [in a prepared food item]," which renders it unfit). See infra notes 182-182 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Bryer v. Rath Packing Co.
Yong Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 448.
Id. at 448-49.
221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959).
This was the advertisement on the can label. Id. at 107, 156 A.2d at 444.
Id. at 107, 156 A.2d at 443-44.
Id. at 108, 156 A.2d at 444.
Id. at 113, 156 A.2d at 447. This statement suggests the consumer's reasonable expectation test should be used to determine liability for a manufacturing defect in food products.
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(a) arises from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable
care; or
(b) is a manufacturing defect under § 2(a) or a defect that
may be inferred under § 3 and the seller's marketing
of the product would cause a reasonable person in the
position of the buyer to expect the used product to
present no greater risk of defect than if the product
were new; or
(c)' is a defect under § 2 or § 3 in a used product
remanufactured by the seller or a predecessor in the
commercial chain or distribution of the used product;
or
(d) arises from a used product's noncompliance under § 4
with a product safety statute or regulation applicable
to the used product.
A used product is a product that, prior to the time of sale or
other distribution referred to in this Section, is commercially
sold or otherwise distributed to a buyer not in the commercial chain of distribution and used for some period of
time. 187
Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) sets forth when dealers selling or
distributing used 188 products that are defective should be liable for
harm caused as a result. 189 Although the policy behind adopting products liability standards for sellers of used products differs from those
who deal in new products, under special circumstances a seller of used
goods may be subject to a claim in strict liability.190 For instance,
when a dealer reviews and updates the used product, he may be liable
for harm that results from a defect in the product. 191
Section 8(a) expands potential liability imposed upon commercial
sellers and distributors of defective, used products resulting from the
seller's failure to exercise reasonable care. 192 This includes conduct
by the seller that makes the products defective or allows defects to
remain when reasonable care would have eliminated them. 193 Section
8(b) of the Restatement (Third) specifically addresses distribution and
dealership of used products, whereas the Restatement (Second) is
silent. 194
(THIRD) § 8.
See id.
[d.
[d. § 8 cmt. a.
[d. The discounted price of the used product, when compared to a new
product, does not relieve the seller of responsibility for such defects. [d.
192. [d. § 8(a), cmt. a.
193. [d.
194. Compare [d. § 8(b) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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s

Lesser Liability Imposed: Maryland Liability of Commercial Seller of Defective Used Products Compared to Section 8

Liability for sellers of used products set forth in section 8 of the
Restatement (Third) is broader than the rule under current Maryland
law. In Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, Inc.,l95 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that dealers of used goods should not, in most
instances, be strictly liable for defects created by the manufacturer. 196
In dicta, the court limited liability of dealers in used goods.to defects
in the product created by the dealer, himself, or where the dealer
knew or should have known of the existence of the manufacturing
defect. 197
b.

The "Sealed Container" Defense Possibly Precludes Maryland's Adoption
of Section 8(b)

It is possible that a seller or distributor of used products deviating
from their intended design198 may be immune from liability as a result
of Maryland's statutory "sealed container" defense. 199 Section 5-405
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
provides in pertinent part:

(b) It shall be a defense to an action against a seller of a
product for property damage or personal injury allegedly caused by the defective design or manufacturer
195. 77 Md. App. 41, 55, 549 A.2d 385, 392 (1988) (declining to impose strict
liability on car dealership for defects in a used car causing plaintiff's injuries); see also supra note 90 for a more thorough discussion of the facts and
rules of law promulgated in Harrison.
196. Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 55, 549 A.2d at 392. The court reviewed decisions
of courts in other jurisdictions considering the same issue. See id. (citing
Court v. Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281,282 (Ill. 1978) and Realmuto v. Straub
Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 444 (NJ. 1974)). The Grzelinski court stated
that, "to the extent that plaintiff alleges that the defects were created not
only by the manufacturer, but also by work defectively done by the used car
dealer, his complaint satisfies the requirements." Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d at
282.
197. Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 54-55, 549 A.2d at 392. The plaintiffs relied on res
ipsa loquitor to support a finding of negligence from expert testimony that
molten liquid does not normally fall from the bottom of the dashboard. [d.
(citing Petrus Chrysler-Plymouth v. Davis, 671 S.W.2d 749 (Ark. 1984) for the
"knew or should have known" standard, similar to the "failure to exercise
reasonable care" standard in section 8(a)). The court dismissed this argument because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the elements of a strict
liability claim. [d. at 51,549 A.2d at 389; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text for the elements required to prove a strict liability claim in
Maryland as set forth Virgil.
198. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for the text of section 2(a) of the
Restatement (Third).

199. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2000); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713, 717-18 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing Maryland's
"sealed container defense" when manufacturing defect in a new product
alleged).
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of a product if the seller establishes that: (1) The
product was acquired and then sold or leased by the
seller in a sealed container or in an unaltered form;
(2) The seller had no knowledge of the defect; (3)
The seller in the performance of the duties he performed or while the product was in his possession
could not have discovered the defect while exercising
reasonable care; (4) The seller did not manufacture,
produce, design, or designate the specifications for
the product which conduct was the proximate and
substantial cause of the claimant's injury; and (5) The
seller did not alter, modify, assemble, or mishandle
the product while in the seller's possession in a manner which was the proximate and substantial cause of
the claimant's injury.2oo
(c) Use of this defense is limited if it would be inequitable
to preclude liability, such as if a judgment cannot be
enforced against the manufacturer; the manufacturer
cannot be identified; or the seller made express warranties, the breach of which resulted in the claimant's
injuries. 201
Although the sealed container defense has been considered in Maryland three times, all of them federal district court cases,202 it is unclear whether the mere fact that the product is used breaks the seal
under the Maryland defense.
III.

CHAPTER 2: LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLERS NOT BASED ON PRODUCT DEFECTS AT TIME OF SALE

A.

Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor

1.

Section 9: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor
for Harm Caused by Misrepresentation
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who, in connection with the sale of a product,
makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the product is subject to lia-

200. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (b) (2000).
201. [d. § 5-405(c).
202. Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 700, 704 (D. Md. 1997)
(asserting sealed container defense properly limited to reinstatement provision requiring uncertainty of federal district court's jurisdiction until conclusion of case); Reed, 934 F. Supp. at 717 (limiting exceptions to the sealed
container rule to those enumerated in the statute, including when express
warranties have been made); Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D.
Md. 1991) (applying the sealed container rule to insulate the seller from
liability because the plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence that a judgment against the manufacture is unenforceable).

310

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

bility for hann to persons or property caused by the
misrepresentation. 203
Section 9 of the Restatement (Third) addresses the liability of commercial product sellers or distributors for harm caused by misrepresentations that may be negligent, fraudulent, or innocent. 204 Under
this section, a plaintiff is not required to prove the product was defective at the time of its sale or distribution so long as the misrepresentation was material and the actual cause of the harm. 205 Although the
tort rule set forth in this section would not apply to mere economic
loss caused by harm to the product itself,206 it will often overlap with
an independent basis for recovery under a breach of express warranty
theory under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Although section 9 of the Restatement (Third) has not been formally
adopted, Maryland law is in general accord with this section. 207 Thus,
when the issue of negligent, fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation 208 arises in Maryland, the courts decide these issues separately
under existing case law and the Restatement (Second).209
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 9.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See infra note 352 and accompanying text for the text of RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 20.
207. See, e.g., Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 756-57,
556 A.2d 1126, 1133 (1989) (alleging negligent misrepresentation of product qualities although absence of reliance defeated causation requirement); Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 307-08, 550 A.2d 389,
401 (1988) (denying recovery for negligent misrepresentation as to the
product's quality where buyer sustained only "economic loss," but recovery
for breach of warranties allowed). See also MPJI 11:1 (deceit), 19:6 (negligent misrepresentation), 26:6 (express warranty).
208. "Liability for innocent product misrepresentation is stated in the Restatement, Second, of Torts Section 402B." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 9 cmt. b.
The issue of misrepresentation in advertising under section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) was raised by the plaintiff in Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988) in the circuit court, but the
presiding judge granted the defendants' motion for judgment on this issue
which was subsequently not raised on appeal. Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 615,
539 A.2d at 702.
209. Fraudulent misrepresentation may be resolved under the tort of deceit. To
prove deceit in Maryland, a litigant must show: (1) that the representation
made is false; (2) that its falsity was either known to the speaker or the
misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to truth as to
be the equivalent to actual knowledge; (3) that it was made for the purpose
of defrauding the person claiming to be i~ured thereby; (4) that such person both relied upon the misrepresentation and had a right to rely upon it,
fully believing its truth; (5) that he would have not acted, and the resulting
injury not have been caused, had the misrepresentation not been made;
and (6) actual damages resulted as a direct result of the fraudulent misrepresentation. See Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333, 439
A.2d 534, 536 (1982); Gittings v. VonDorn, 136 Md. 10, 15-16, 109 A. 553,
554 (1920); Additionally, "an intermediate seller who provides false or deceptive information to a consumer is directly liable under the Consumer
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Section 10: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor
for Harm Caused by Post-Sale Failure to Warn
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products is subject to liability for hann to
persons or property caused by the seller's failure to
provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution
of a product if a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide such a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning after the time of sale if:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that
the product poses a substantial risk of hann to
persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can
be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be
unaware of the risk of hann; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and
acted on by those to whom a warning might be
provided; and
(4) the risk of hann is sufficiently geat to justify the
burden of providing a warning. 10

Section 10 of the Restatement (Third) places a duty on a product's
manufacturer, seller, or distributor to warn consumers of a product
where the producer discovers after its sale that the product poses a
substantial risk of harm. 211 Failure to provide such a warning results
Protection Act." Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 544, 667
A.2d 624, 637 (1994). To prove negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff
must show: (1) that the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff,
negligently asserted a false statement; (2) that the defendant intended the
plaintiff to act upon his statement; (3) that the defendant knew the plaintiff
would probably rely on the statement, which if erroneous, would cause loss
or injury; (4) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation;
and (5) that the Plaintiff suffered proximate damages as a result. See Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783, (1988); Martens Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). Claims of innocent misrepresentation are resolved under section 402B of the Restatement (Second),
which states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold
by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation,
even though: a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and b)
the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relations with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402B.
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10.
211. DeSantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d 624, 626 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (quoting section 10
of the Restatement (Third).
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in the seller's liability if a reasonable person in the same situation
would have provided such a warning. 212
Cognizant of the onerous burden of post-sale warnings on commerce, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) warn that, if unfounded,
it would impose unacceptable burdens on manufacturers and sellers.213 Liability is limited to parties with actual knowledge of the risk
creating the post-sale duty to warn or those who reasonably should
have known of the defect.214 Because a retailer is generally not in a
position to know of this information, the retailer is normally not liable
for failure to warn of a defect discovered after the sale. 215
Maryland law already embraces the continuing duty of a product
seller to make reasonable efforts to warn of product defects of which
the seller becomes aware after the product has left the seller's hands.
The fact that a manufacturer or seller discontinued its product line or
that the plaintiff no longer uses or is exposed to the product does not
automatically relieve the manufacturer or seller of its continuing duty
to warn. Rather, such matters are factors in determining what reasonable efforts to discover the danger and to warn are required, considered along with the likelihood of harm without the warning, the
economic costs and practical limitations associated with giving the
warning, and the difficulty in contacting the parties to be warned. 216
The continuing duty to warn applies not only to harm caused to per-

212. [d.
A reasonable person would provide such a warning if: one, the
seller knew or reasonably should have known there was a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; two, the parties at risk of
harm could be identified and reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; three, the warning could be communicated to and acted upon by those to whom it is given; and four, the
risk of injury is sufficiently great to justify providing the warning.
[d.

213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10 cmt. a.
214. [d.
215. [d. Once a retailer is made aware of the risk, however, the retailer is also
subject to liability for failure to warn if a reasonable person in the retailer's
position would have made such a warning. [d.
216. Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 448 n. 3, 601 A.2d 633, 647 n.13
(1992). In Owens-Illinois, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
manufacturer or seller has a post-sale duty to warn consumers when it
learns of a dangerous defect in the product, even if the production of the
item has been discontinued. Id. at 448, 601 A.2d at 647. Once a manufacturer knows or should have known of defects discovered after a sale, it has a
duty to use reasonable efforts to inform users of the hazards. See id. (citing
Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971».
Other Maryland cases imposing the post-sale duty to warn include Ra[5in v.
Porter Hayden Co., 133 Md. App. 116, 754 A.2d 503 (2000) and ACandS v.
Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998).
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sons, but also to property.217 These factors parallel those suggested in
section 10 of the Restatement (Third).

3 .. Section 11: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor
for Harm Caused by Post-Sale Failure to Recall Product
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is subject to liability for hann to persons or
property caused by the seller's failure to recall a product after the time of sale or distribution if:
(a) (I) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the
product; or
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall
requirement under Subsection (a)(I), undertakes
to recall the product; and
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable person in recalling the product. 218

There are no reported Maryland decisions on this topic. Given the
significant burdens imposed on manufacturers when recalling products, Maryland courts are likely to embrace section 11 's fundamental
policy of allowing governmental regulatory agencies to evaluate the
ramifications of product recall by gathering relevant data. 219 This policy recognizes that a common-law duty to recall that would be triggered every time a manufacturer made a product line improvement,
even if to correct a product defect, would be undesirable. 220
IV.

CHAPTER 3: LIABILI1Y OF SUCCESSORS AND APPARENT
MANUFACTURERS

A.

Liability of Successors

1.

Section 12: Liability of Successor for Harm Caused by Defective
Products Sold Commercially by Predecessors
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a predecessor corporation or other business
entity is subject to liability for hann to persons or property

217. United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 165, 647
A.2d 405, 414 (1994) (imposing strict liability for asbestos-containing surface treatment materials incorporated into structures of public buildings).
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § II.
219. Seeid.
220. A duty to recall should be distinguished from a post-sale duty to warn about
product hazards, as in sections 10 and 13 of the Restatement (Third). See
supra text accompanying note 210 for the text of Restatement (Third) section
10; infra text accompanying note 242 for the text of Restatement (Third) section 13.
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caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed
commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition:
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to
assume such liability; or
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor; or
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of
the predecessor. 221
The Restatement (Third)'s approach to the liability of successor corporations for products sold by their predecessors follows the rule of
the overwhelming majority of states, including Maryland. 222 A successor corporation will not be liable for the predecessor's products absent the presence of one of the four special circumstances articulated
in subparagraphs (a) through (d) of section 12.223
a.

Maryland's Imposition of Liability and Exceptions Thereto on Successor
Entities For Acts of Predecessor Organization

Maryland imposes liability and provides exceptions to liability onto
successor entities for acts of predecessor entities both through judicial
decisions and statutory enactments.
(1)

Judicially Imposed Liability and Exceptions in Maryland

In Nissen Corp. v. Mille?24 a consumer was injured on a treadmill
manufactured by a corporation sold to a successor entity.225 In that
case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted "the general rule of
non-liability of a successor corporation, with its four traditional exceptions."226 The "four traditional exceptions" that result in the succes221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12.
222. See infra notes 226-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicially
imposed liability on successor organizations.
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12.
224. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
225. [d. at 615,594 A.2d at 565. Fredrick Brandt bought a treadmill from Atlantic Fitness Products that was designed, manufactured, and marketed by
American Tredex Corporation. [d. Later that year, Nissen Corporation
purchased the trade name, patents, inventory, and other assets of American
Tredex in an asset purchase agreement. [d. The agreement included some
obligations and liabilities but expressly excluded assumption of liability for
injuries resulting from any product previously sold by American Tredex.
[d. American Tredex would continue for five years under the name AT
Corporation. [d. Over five years after his purchase, Brandt was injured using his treadmill. [d. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565. He filed suit against American Tredex, AT Corporation (after it had been administratively dissolved),
Nissen, and Atlantic. [d.
226. 323 Md. 613, 619, 632,594 A.2d 564, 566, 573 (1991). The court declined
to add a fifth exception to successor non-liability, "continuity of enterprise."
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sor entity being liable occur when: "(1) there is an express or implied
agreement to assume the liabilities; (2) the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger; (3) the successor entity is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor entity; or (4) the transaction
was fraudulent, not made in good faith, or made without sufficient
consideration."227 Although phrased in the converse and ordered differently, the substance of section 12 of the Restatement (Third) was
adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Nissen Corp. v.
Miller. 228
(2)

Statutorily Created Liability of Successor Entities in Maryland
The Nissen court229 also recognized two statutorily created excep-

tions to the general rule that a successor corporation is not liable for
acts of the predecessor entity-section 3-115 of the Corporations and
Associations Article of the Maryland Code and the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, contained in the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland
Code. 230
Section 3-115 (c) of the Corporations and Associations Article "provides that upon transfer of all or substantially all assets, [t] he successor
is liable for all the debts and obligations of the transferor to the extent
provided in the Articles of Transfer."231 When comparing section 12
of the Restatement (Third) to this subsection, under this statute, Maryland will at least impose liability for obligations expressly agreed
under section 12(a) as set forth in the Articles of Transfer. 232
Section 3-115(e) "provides that following a consolidation or merger
'[ t] he successor is liable for all debts and obligations of each nonsurviving corporation."'233 Section 12(c) of the Restatement (Third)
provides that a successor entity is liable for acts of the predecessor if
the joining of the organizations "constitutes a consolidation or merger
with the predecessor."234 In a consolidation, two or more entities are

227.

228.
229.
230.
23l.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565. See infra notes 239, 241 and accompanying text
for an elaboration of the distinctions between continuity of enterprise and
continuation of the predecessor.
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566 (footnotes omitted in original)
(citing 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 7:1, at 10-12 (Travers
rev. ed. 1999); accord 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAND, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2.06 (1989); 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRNATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 231 (rev. perm. ed. 1990)).
Compare supra note 226 and accompanying text with text accompanying
supra note 22l.
See supra notes 225-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nissen
Corp.
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617-18,594 A.2d at 566 (discussing Smith v. Navistar
Int'[ Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988)).
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 3-114(c) (2001).
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566 (citing Smith, 737 F. Supp. at
1446).
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 3-114(e) (2001).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12(c).
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joined and dissolved, resulting in a new entity, whereas, in a merger,
two or more entities are joined and one of the original entities
emerges as the successor entity.235 Because there is a non-surviving
entity in both, the application of section 3-115(e) of the Maryland
Code and section 12(c) of the Restatement (Third) is the same-liability
is imposed on successor entities of the non-surviving predecessor of
the acts of the predecessor that would otherwise impose liability had it
remained in existence.
Liability on successor entities is additionally imposed as a result of
the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, contained in title 15 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code. 236 These provisions "protect[ ]
the rights of creditors of a corporation which transfers its assets with
an intent to defraud or without fair consideration .... "237 This is analogous to section 12(b) of the Restatement (Third), which imposes liability on successor entities that "result[ ] from a fraudulent conveyance
to escape liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor. ... "238
b.

Continuation of Predecessor Distinguished From Continuity of Enterprise

The "continuation of the predecessor" exception recognized in subparagraph (d) of section 12 should not be confused with the more
liberal "continuity of enterprise" exception adopted by a small minority of states. Under this minority approach, liability may be imposed if
there is a mere continuation of the predecessor's business activities
even though there is no continuity of shareholders, officers, or directors.239 Both Maryland and the Restatement (Third) have rejected that
minority exception. 240
In determining whether the continuation of the predecessor exception recognized in section 12(d) of the Restatement (Third) applies, the
most important indicia of continuation, in addition to continuation of
the predecessor's business activities, are common identities of officers,
directors, and shareholders in the predecessor and successor
corporations. 241
235. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 303, 1002 (7th ed. 1999).
236. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
237. Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617-18,594 A.2d at 566 (quoting Smith, 737 F. Supp.
at 1446.
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12(b).
239. This theory is largely based on the on the need to compensate victims eligible under section 402A of the Restatement (Second). See Nissen Corp, 323 Md.
at 619, 594 A.2d at 567 (quoting Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 892 F.2d 75, 80
(3rd Cir. 1986».
240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nissen Corp.;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. b.
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. g.
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Section 13: Liability of Successor for Harm Caused by Successor's
Own Post-Sale Failure to Warn
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that
acquires assets of a predecessor corporation or other
business entity, whether or not liable under the rule
stated in § 12, is subject to liability for hann to persons or property caused by the successor's failure to
warn of a risk created by a product sold or distributed
by the predecessor if:
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services for maintenance or repair of the product or
enters into a similar relationship with purchasers
of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual
or potential economic advantage to the successor;
and
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor
would provide a warning if:
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know
that the product poses a substantial risk of hann
to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can
be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be
unaware of the risk of hann; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and
acted on by those to whom a warning might be
provided; and
(4) the risk of hann is sufficiently ~eat to justify the
burden of providing a warning. 42

Under section 13 of the Restatement (Third), the successor is generally considered to be a pure volunteer upon whom there is no legal
duty to act or warn. 243 Exceptions arise in two circumstances: (1) the
successor entered into a relationship with purchasers of the predecessor's products, such as a maintenance agreement, that results in actual
or potential economic advantage; and (2) a reasonable person in the
position of the successor would provide a warning of the defect. 244
Section 13 imposes greater liability on successor entities that become
involved with the predecessor product and its users, in comparison to
section 12, where there is no similar relationship.245
There is no reported decision that clearly articulates whether and, if
so, under what circumstances, Maryland imposes a duty on a successor
242.
243.
244.
245.

[d. § 13.
See id.
See id.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 with supra text accompanying note 242.
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corporation to warn of risks created by a product sold or distributed
by its predecessor. Dicta in two products liability cases considered by
Maryland courts, however, is instructive. 246
In ACandS, Inc. v. Abate,247 Maryland's intermediate appellate court
appears to have approved the liability of a successor for a failure to
warn of the hazards of asbestos products of its predecessor. 248 Successor liability was addressed within a more general discussion of alleged
juror confusion regarding the court's charge. 249 The trial judge informed the jury that there was a successor liability claim against Rapid,
one of the appellant-defendants, and that the claims against Rapid
involved the predecessor entity.250 The trial court had previously instructed the jury of the continuing duty of a manufacturer to reasonably warn of product defects that the manufacturer discovers after the
time the sale, and did not modify its instruction when instructing the
jury about the successor liability.251 Counsel for Rapid, the successor
246. See Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 613,594 A.2d at 564; ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md.
App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998).
247. 121 Md. App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998).
248. Id. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968. ACandS was an appeal of the second of two
consolidated trials in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City known as "Abate
II," concerning litigation over asbestos-containing products. Id. at 602, 710
A.2d at 950. See also ACandS, Inc. v. Goodwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116
(1995). Abate II involved five trial plaintiffs and an estimated 1,300 common-issue plaintiffs. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 602, 710 A.2d at 950. The
plaintiffs filed claims of negligence and strict liability against eleven defendants, five of who were appellants in the appeal: Rapid American Corp.
("Rapid"), the successor in interest to Philip Carey Mfg. Co.; John Crane,
Inc. ("Crane"); US Mineral Production Co. ("U.S. Mineral"); E.L. Stebbing
& Co., Inc. ("Stebbing"); and Hampshire Indust., Inc. ("Hampshire"). Id.
at 604,710 A.2d at 951. Abate II was divided into three phases. Id. at 60507,710 A.2d at 951-52. The parameters of the appeal were determined by a
threejudge panel from members of the court of special appeals. Id. at 608,
710 A.2d at 953. As a result, the appeal of any order lacking the amount of
damages was dismissed because there was no final order from which to appeal, leaving only Rapid, Crane, U.S. Mineral, Stebbing and Hampshire eligible to proceed with the appeal. Id.
249. Id. at 636-37, 710 A.2d at 967-68.
250. Id. The appellate court recounted the trial judge's finding:
[T]here were successor liability claims against Rapid [and another
successor not included in this appeal]. [The trial judge] later instructed the jury that the claims against Rapid involved the Philip
Carey Manufacturing Company, which because Philip Carey Corporation in 1967. The judge explained: "1 have made a legal decision that you need not consider [Rapid's] liability for the Philip
Carey Manufacturing Company ['old Carey, '] or the Philip Carey
Corporation, new Carey, for any actions after June 1, 1967 .... Now
I have also ruled, as a matter of law, that [Rapid] is liable as a successor to Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, which is old Carey,
for its products and actions up through June 1, [19]67. "
Id. at 637, 710 A.2d at 967 (alteration in original). See also supra note 248
for a list of the appellant-defendants in ACandS.
251. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 637, 710 A.2d at 967-68. The appellate court discussed the trial court's instruction:
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entity, argued that the judge's instruction prohibited the jury from
finding Rapid had successor liability for its predecessor beyond June
1, 1967, the date that the predecessor organized as another business
entity.252 In resolving the issue, the appellate court stated:
As its verdict makes clear, the jury disagreed. In light of [the
trial judge's] instruction as to the continuing duty to warn,
that disagreement was quite logical. It is apparent that the
judge meant merely to inform the jury that it could not hold
Rapid liable for the actions of new Carey. We acknowledge
that the instruction could have been more carefully worded.
We do not agree, however, that it can be read to foreclose a
finding that old Carey or its successor, Rapid, had a continuing duty to warn after 1967. 253

In essence, the court ruled that a successor may not be liable for failing to warn after becoming a successor entity. To simplify, an inference can be drawn from the last-quoted sentence that a successor
entity may have a continuing duty to warn of products of its
predecessor.
It is important to note the limitations of this case in relation to Maryland's adoption of the Restatement (Third). The court did not discuss
whether the criteria necessary for liability under section 13 were present, specifically whether the successor continued some sort of forprofit relationship with the predecessor's clients or whether a reasonable person would have made the warning. 254 Also, there is no determination by the court that there is a duty to warn, merely a holding
that the instruction given to the jury is not limited to a finding that
Previously, in the context of explaining the duty to warn of product
defects, [the trial judge] had instructed the jury as follows:
"Now, there is also what is called a continuing duty to warn. A
manufacturer of the defective product generally has the duty to
warn of product defects which the manufacturer discovers at the
time of the sale. A manufacturer is obligated to reasonably communicate an effective warning even after a sale of a product based
on later acquired knowledge of the danger as soon as it is reasonably foreseeable.
This post-sale duty to warn requires reasonable efforts to inform
users of the danger once the manufacturer is or should be aware of
the need for a warning. The warning is required to the extent
practicable under the circumstances."
The judge did not modify his instruction on duty to warn when he
instructed the jury about old and new Carey.
Id. at 637-38, 710 A.2d at 967-68.
252. Id. See also supra note 250 for an excerpt of the trial court's instruction to
the jury regarding Rapid and old and new Carey and supra note 251 for an
excerpt of the trial court's instruction to the jury.
253. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968 (emphasis added).
254. See supra text accompanying note 242 for the text of section 13 of the Restatement (Third).

320

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

the successor had a continuing duty to warn.255 The court of special
appeals did not disclose the circumstances under which the trial court
had imposed successor liability nor its basis for charging the jury regarding a continuing duty to warn. Thus, it cannot be determined
from the facts disclosed in the opinion whether Maryland law follows
the rule enunciated in section 13 of the Restatement (Third).256

3.

Section 14: Selling or Distributing as One's Own a Product Manufactured by Another
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes as its own a product
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though the seller or distributor were the product's
manufacturer. 257

Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) embodies the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine whereby a business distributing products manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as if the distributor
had actually manufactured the product. 258 This section is derived
from section 400 of the Restatement (Second),259 which establishes faultbased liability on manufacturers and distinguishes manufacturers
from non-manufacturer product sellers. 26o Because section 402A of
255. See supra text accompanying note 253 for the holding of the court in
ACandS regarding this issue.
256. As discussed under section 12, in Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland reviewed its rationale for adopting strict products liability, stating "We adopted the theory of strict liability in tort to foreclose the unfair
result 'where injured parties are forced to comply with the proof requirements of negligence actions or are confronted with the procedural requirements and limitations of warranty actions." Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md.
613,623,594 A.2d 564, 569 (quoting Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md.
377,353,363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976)). The court explained that, while the
"equity" of shifting the risk of loss to those better able to bear it was a policy
consideration, it was not the only consideration, and that the idea that sellers who place defective and unreasonably dangerous products on the market are at fault when someone is injured and should be held responsible is
inherent in recognizing strict products liability. Id. at 624,594 A.2d at 569.
"A corporate successor is not a seller and bears no blame in bringing the
product and the user together." Id. The court believed that it was unfair to
require such a party to bear the liability because it is perceived as a "deep
pocket." Id. See also supra section 12 beginning at note 221 for a discussion of Maryland's general rule for adoption of successor liability.
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14.
258. See id.; see also id. § 14 cmt. c. This doctrine does not apply to impose liability on a trademark owner who grants a manufacturer a license to use the
trademark or logo on the product, so long as the trademark owner does
not substantially participate in the product's design, manufacture, or distribution. Id. § 14 cmt. d.
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 400. Section 400 states: "One who puts out as his
own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as through he were its manufacturer." Id.
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14 cmt. a.
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the Restatement (Second) imposed strict liability on all commercial sellers of defective products for injuries that resulted from the defect,261
this section is only relevant in jurisdictions that treat the liability of
non-manufacturers differently than manufacturers. 262 Although Maryland courts initially did not differentiate between sellers and manufacturers when imposing strict liability for defective products,263 for
sellers of defective products who, generally, did not manufacture, alter, or mishandle the product, did not know of the defect, and could
not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care,264
the Maryland legislature created an exception in the form of a sealedcontainer defense. 265 The sealed-container defense does not apply to
sellers who "manufacture, produce, design, or designate the specifications for the product"266 or who "alter, modify, assemble, or mishandle the product."267 It is not clear whether this defense is applicable
to sellers "who sell [ ] or distribute [ ] as [their] own a product manufactured by another,"268 as is set forth in section 14 of the Restatement
(Third).

V.

CHAPTER 4: PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILI1Y

A.

Causation

1.

Section 15: General Rule Governing Causal Connection Between
Product Defect and Harm
Whether a product defect caused hann to persons or property is detennined by the Erevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort. 2 9

Maryland law requires that, under strict liability principles, a product defect must be the proximate cause-in-fact of the harm for which
261. [d.
262. See id. § 14 cmt. b; see also William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability and New Jersey Law-Not Quite Perfect Together, 50
RUTGERS L. REv. 2059, 2131 (1998) (noting that "[w]hether section 400
had been superceded by section 402A, which imposed strict liability on all
product sellers, is of little moment because the outcome remains the
same").
263. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955,
963 (1976).
264. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2000); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 934 F. Supp. 713,713 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing Maryland's "sealed
container defense" when manufacturing defect in a new product alleged).
265. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland's sealed container statute, contained in section 5-405(b) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.
266. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405(4) (2000).
267. [d. § 5-405(5).
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14.
269. [d. § 15.
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recovery is sought. 270 Maryland courts have not adopted alternative
theories of liability that would relieve a plaintiff of proving this burden, such as market share liability.271
The concepts of product misuse, modification, and alteration are
forms of post-sale conduct by product-users or others that can be relevant to the determination of issues of defect,272 causation,273 and apportionment of liability.274 As such, they are not discrete legal
issues 275 but rather are largely intertwined with the concept of foreseeability, fairness in allocating the burdens of proof, and responsibility
among the parties. The Restatement (Third) does not address the allocation of these burdens, which may differ widely from one jurisdiction
to the next. 276

270. See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); see also
generally TidIer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiffs' recovery because, as they were unable to identify the defendants as the manufacturer of the drug they had ingested, they lacked the
"essential element of a traditional products liability claim"-causation) (applying Maryland and District of Columbia laws); Foster v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 167-68 ( D. Md. 1994) (denying plaintiffs' claim
for negligent misrepresentation against a drug manufacturer initiated after
their daughter's death by ingesting a generic equivalent of the defendant's
drug because Maryland courts require showing that the defendant manufactured the injury-causing product); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721
F. Supp. 89, 93 (D. Md. 1989) (denying recovery to a plaintiff unable to
prove that defendant had manufactured the breast implant causing her injury and refusing to adopt a market-share approach, stating Maryland law
"requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant manufactured the product which allegedly caused the injury.").
271. Using a market-share theory of liability, plaintiffs may recover against each
manufacturer proportionally according to each manufacturer's share of the
market, without having to prove causation for each defendant. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 15 cmt. c. Some courts have rejected this market share
approach because it is inconsistent with the concept of joint and several
liability, the general rule of causation in tort law. [d. In Tidier, the court
stated that the market-share approach is often rejected because approach
because of the difficulty in apportioning the damages. Tidier, 851 F.2d at
422 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), which
applied the market-share approach in determining defendants' liability).
Although the Restatement (Third) takes no position on whether the marketshare theory of proportional liability should be adopted, a substantial number of courts addressing the issue have refused to adopt such a rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 15 cmt. c.
272. [d. § 2. See supra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2 of the
Restatement (Third).
273. Causation is discussed in this section.
274. RESTATEMENT § 17. See infra text accompanying note 295 for the text of
section 17 of the Restatement (Third).
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. p.
276. See id. §§ 2 cmt. p, 15 cmt. b, 17 cmts. c, d. For a discussion of the current
Maryland law on these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 295-322.
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Section 16: Increased Harm Due to Product Defect
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial
sale or other distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiff's hann suffered
beyond that which would have resulted from other
causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the
increased hann.
(b) If proof supports a determination of the hann that
would have resulted from other causes in the absence
of the product defect, the product seller's liability is
limited to the increased hann attributable solely to
product defect.
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the hann that would have resulted in the
absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiff's hann attributable to the
defect and other causes.
(d) A seller of a defective product that is held liable for
part of the hann suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (b), or all the hann suffered by the plaintiff
under Subsection (c), is jointly and severally liable or
severally liable with other parties who bear legal responsibility for causing the hann, determined by applicable rules of joint and several liability.277

Section 16 of the Restatement (Third) addresses "enhanced injury"
claims, also referred to as "crashworthiness" or "second-collision"
cases. 278 In order to recover for enhanced injuries in a product-defect
case under this section, a plaintiff must establish that the defect was a
substantial factor in producing harm to the plaintiff, beyond the harm
that would have resulted from causes not related to the defect. 279 For
example, in a design-defect claim, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable, alternative design would have reduced the plaintiff's injuries
in the accident as well as not create other, different injuries. 28o
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 16.
278. [d. § 16 cmt. a (explaining that section 16 addresses "crashworthiness"
cases). These cases may be referred to as enhanced injury cases because
the plaintiff's claim is not that the defect in the product caused the accident, rather, that the injury resulting from the accident was either the
cause of or exacerbated by, the defect. [d. These cases are typically
brought against car manufacturers, whose design of a vehicle caused enhanced injuries during an accident that was otherwise unrelated to the defect. [d.
279. See id. § 16 cmt. a.
280. [d. § 16 cmt. b. Comment b states:
[I] n connection with a design defect claim in the context of increased harm, the plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced plaintiff's harm . . . . It is not
sufficient that the alternative design would have reduced or pre-
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Maryland law is consistent with the rules established in section
16. 281 The "crashworthiness" doctrine was recognized in 1974 in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young. 282 In Volkswagen, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that actions based on crashworthiness claims are essentially negligence claims and, therefore, liability should be imposed
on a manufacturer based on "traditional principles of negligence."283
Although jurisdictions differed regarding the level of accident foreseeability and the extent to which a manufacturer should prevent injury,
the Volkswagen court held that a manufacturer had a duty to reduce
injuries in accidents when possible. 284
The burden on the Maryland plaintiff establishing a prima facie enhanced injury cause of action is appropriately high. Six elements
must be shown: (1) that a safer alternative design existed; (2) that it

281.

282.

283.
284.

vented the harm the plaintiff suffered if the alternative would introduce into the product other dangers of equal or greater
magnitude.
Id.; accord Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 625-28,
539 A.2d 701, 707-08 (1998) (denying recovery for plaintifPs enhanced injuries because of failure to prove that the proposed design alternative, motorcycle crash bars, would have protected lower extremities without
significantly increasing the risk of injury to other parts of the body).
See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 120,740 A.2d 102, 118
(1999) (involving death from vehicle accident, "the plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence to establish that the design of the vehicle in question
caused an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal"); Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at
627, 539 A.2d at 708 (design-defect claim-motorcycle crash bars) (finding
plaintiff produced insufficient evidence "that the injuries sustained would
have been lessened because of the presence of a protective device"); Valk
Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 327, 537 A.2d 622, 633 (1988)
(design- defect claim-protruding snow plow hitch) ("[AJ plaintiff need
show only some evidence of enhanced injuries [caused by a product defect]."); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 41 Md. App. 579, 589,
398 A.2d. 490, 498 (1979) (manufacturing defect claim-van roof welds);
see also Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975)
(design defect claim-automobile roof and seat assembly); Volkswagen of
Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974) (design defect
claim-automobile seat assembly); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md.
App. 695, 566 A.2d 135 (1989) (design defect claim-motorcycle crash
bars).
272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). In trying this wrongful death action, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified a question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland regarding the liability of manufacturers in enhanced injury cases under Maryland law. Id. at 203, 321 A.2d at
738. The plaintiffs alleged that the death of the driver of the 1968 Volkswagen Beetle resulted from the defective design of the passenger compartment. Id. at 203-05, 321 A.2d at 738-39. The driver, stopped at a traffic
light, was rear-ended by another car. Id. at 204, 321 A.2d at 739. Relying
on the crashworthiness doctrine, the plaintiffs claimed that the seat assembly failed during the collision, propelling the driver into the rear of the car
where he sustained the fatal injuries. Id. at 204-06, 321 A.2d at 739-40. This
defect, not the accident, caused or enhanced the driver's injuries after the
initial accident. Id.
Id. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747.
Id. at 214-215, 321 A.2d at 744.
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was technologically feasible to incorporate the alternative design at
the time the product was manufactured; (3) that the materials required for the alternative design were available; (4) the anticipated
cost of production with the alternative design; (5) the anticipated
price to consumer with the alternative design; and (6) the likelihood
of consumer acceptance of the alternative design.285 Further, the
plaintiff must also demonstrate that the design utilized caused more
injuries than an alternative design would. 286 In cases where the injury
resulted in death, the plaintiff must prove that the defective design
"caused an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal."287
The manufacturer of a product, such as a car, is not required to
design a perfectly safe product under the crashworthiness doctrine; it
is only required to use reasonable care in the product's design while
also incorporating safer designs when possible to prevent enhanced
injuries in foreseeable accidents. 288 Further, if the enhanced injury is
the result of a less safe design that would be obvious to the user, such
as a convertible roof-top versus a hard roof-top on an automobile,
then the plaintiff's recovery is precluded. 289
Consistent with section 16 (c), Maryland law provides that if a plaintiff establishes that a product defect was a substantial factor in increasing the harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond that which would have
resulted from other causes, and if the proof adduced at trial does not
support apportionment of liability, then the product seller is liable for
all the harm suffered by the plaintiff from both the defect and the
other causes. 290 Stated conversely, once the plaintiff establishes that
at least some injuries were enhanced due to a defect, the burden shifts
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. at 120, 740 A.2d at 118.

Id.
Id.

See Volkswagen, 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745-46.
[d. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746-47. For example, in Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor
Co. Ltd., 80 Md. App. 695, 566 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's holding granting summary
judgment to the defendants, Yamaha Motor Company. [d. at 721,566 A.2d
at 148. In Nicolson, the plaintiff sustained injury to his legs as a result of an
accident between his motorcycle and an automobile that had turned into
the plaintiff's path. [d. at 697, 566 A.2d at 136. The plaintiff claimed that
his injuries were caused, or enhanced, by the failure of the defendant to
incorporate protective devices on the motorcycle. [d. The appellate court
upheld the lower courts ruling on summary judgment because of the "latent/patent rule," limiting the manufacturer's liability when the defect was
"open and obvious to the consumer." [d. at 715, 566 A.2d at 145. The
court explained that this is an objective, rather than subjective rule, and the
test is whether a reasonable consumer in the plaintiff's position would have
noticed the danger in the particular design. [d.
290. See Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App 579, 590, 398 A.2d
490,501 (1979) ("indivisible injury"); see also Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy,
74 Md. App. 304, 326-27, 537 A.2d 622,633 (1988) ("[O]nce a plaintiff has
shown a modicum of enhanced injuries by testimony that the defect caused
an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal, the burden should shift to the
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to the defendant to limit liability.291 The defendant may do so by
showing which injuries would have occurred had there been no defect. 292 This shift of the burden onto the defendant is consistent with
traditional tort law. 293 The manufacturer of a defective product is
jointly and severally liable for harm enhanced as a result of a defective
product. 294

B.

Affirmative Defenses

1.

Section 17: Apportionment of Responsibility Between or Among
Plaintiff, Sellers and Distributors of Defective Products, and
Others
(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for hann caused by a
product defect may be reduced if the conduct of the
plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause
the hann and the plaintiff's conduct fails to conform
to generally applicable rules establishing appropriate
standards of care.
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection (a) and the apportionment of plaintiff's recovery among multiple defendants are governed by
generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility.295

Section 17 defers to local law for the applicable rules of apportion~
ment of liability, if any, among the various actors whose conduct or
products contribute to the plaintiff's harm. Unlike the overwhelming
majority of other states, Maryland has not adopted any principles of
defendants to apportion damages inter se and limit their liability, if they
can.") (emphasis added).
291. Lahocki, 41 Md. App. at 595-96, 398 A.2d at 501.
292. [d.
293. [d. at 596, 398 A.2d at 501. In Lahocki, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that once the plaintiff established injuries sustained in an
automobile accident were at least enhanced by a defect in the defendant's
product, it was the defendant's responsibility to limit it's liability. [d.
294. See generally Sinelli v. Ford Motor Co., 810 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D. Md. 1993)
(holding the manufacturer of a defective seat belt jointly and severally liable with negligent driver liability for injuries); Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md.
304, 316, 523 A.2d 1003, 1008 (1987) (finding a physician who negligently
treated an automobile accident victim jointly and severally liable with the
original tortfeasor); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Springmann,
266 Md. 200, 204-05, 292 A.2d 96, 99 (1972) (concluding that anyone signing a minor's driver's license application jointly and severally liable for the
minor's negligent actions); Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore,
Inc., 33 Md. App. 372, 374, 365 A.2d 325, 330 (1976) (finding all negligent
defendants jointly and severally liable in mishandling cargo); Myers v.
Aragona, 21 Md. App. 45, 54, 318 A.2d 263, 268 (1974) (determining all
partners jointly and severally liable for the negligent actions of one
partner).
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17.
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"comparative fault" or "comparative responsibility."296 Section 17
does not alter current Maryland law in this regard, nor would it bar
Maryland from adopting comparative fault principles. Indeed, a
strong m.yority of jurisdictions apply the comparative responsibility
doctrine to products liability actions. 297 In the meantime, however,
current Maryland products liability law regarding contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, misuse and product alteration remains
unaffected by the Restatement (Third).

a.

Contributory Negligence in Maryland Tort Claims

Contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim in
Maryland,298 although it is a defense to a claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.299 Obviously, it also is a defense to a
negligence claim. 30o
(1)

Contributory Negligence by User as a Defense in Maryland Negligence Claims

In 1983, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt comparative negligence principles. 30l Because contributory negligence
was adopted in Maryland in 1847,302 it was well-settled "that a plaintiff
who fails to observe ordinary care for his own safety is contributorily
negligent and is barred from all recovery, regardless of the quantum
of a defendant's primary negligence."303
Although contributory negligence has not enjoyed exclusive domain in Maryland, the court of appeals, however, was not persuaded
296. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460-63, 456
A.2d 894, 904-05 (1983); see Edward S. Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein,
Comparative Fault in Maryland-The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REv. 276
(1982) .
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. a.
298. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985);
Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622 (1988);
Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982).
299. Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448 n.7 (D. Md. 1987);
see also Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271
A.2d 744 (1970).
300. Yong Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 448 n.7.
301. Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905. A mother, on behalf of herself
and her son, brought suit against the local school board and three gym
teachers for damages sustained by her son when he was severely and permanently injured during a gymnastic exercise in physical education class. Id.
at 444,456 A.2d at 895. At trial, plaintiffs sought jury instructions amounting to pure or modified comparative negligence, i.e. that damages should
be diminished in proportion to the child's fault. Id. at 445,456 A.2d at 895.
The trial judge rejected the proposed instructions, implementing those
that would completely bar recovery of damages if the child were found contributorily negligent, which he was. Id. at 445-46, 456 A.2d at 895.
302. Id. at 448,456 A.2d at 897 (citing Irwin v. Spriggs, 6 Gill 200 (1847».
303. Id. at 451, 456 A.2d at 898 (citations omitted).
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by movements toward comparative negligence. Early in the twentieth
century, the General Assembly enacted two statutes-both of which
have been repealed-akin to comparative negligence. 304 In addition,
although none passed, from 1966 to 1982, twenty-one bills were offered to the Maryland legislature seeking to replace contributory negligence with comparative negligence. 305 Of the thirty-nine states
subscribing to comparative fault, thirty-one had done so through statutory enactments. 306 Therefore, in the absence of "a pressing societal
need" to replace contributory negligence with comparative negligence, the court of appeals declined to disturb 135 years of stare
decisis. 307
All things considered, we are unable to say that the circumstances of modem life have so changed as to render contributory negligence a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to
the needs of the people of Maryland. In the final analysis,
whether to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence
in favor of comparative negligence involves fundamental and
basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed
by the legislature. 308
(2)

Contributory Negligence by User in Breach of an Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claim

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held contributory negligence was
an appropriate defense to breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability claim founded in tort, contract, or both.309 This defense may act as a total bar to a plaintiff's recovery.310
It would appear that an individual using a product when he
had actual knowledge of a defect or knowledge of facts
which were so obvious that he must have known of a defect,
is either no longer relying on the seller's express or implied
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 452-53, 456 A.2d at 899.
Id. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904.
Id. at 453,456 A.2d at 899.
Id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902.
Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905.
Erdman v.Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 196-97, 271
A.2d 744, 747 (1970). The plaintiffs in Erdman observed sparks and smoke
emanating from their television set for the third time. Id. at 193, 271 A.2d
at 745-46. Shortly after they turned off the set to go to bed, a fire began in
the area of the television. Id. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747. The court determined that the defect in the set, of which the plaintiffs were well aware,
could no longer be used as a basis for an action of breach of warranty. Id.
at 200, 271 A.2d at 749. Any breach of the warranty was not the proximate
cause of the fire due to the plaintiffs' continued use of an obviously defective product. Id. at 203, 271 A.2d at 750. See also Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448 n.7 (D. Md. 1987).
310. Erdman, 260 Md. at 197, 271 A.2d at 748 (citing Levin v. Walter Kidde &
Co., 251 Md. 560, 561, 248 A.2d 151, 152 (1968».
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warranty or had interjected an intervening cause of his own,
and therefore a breach of such warranty cannot be regarded
as the proximate cause of the ensuing injury.311

b.

Assumption of Risk by User as a Defense in Maryland Tort Claims

Maryland recognizes assumption of therisk312 as an affirmative defense to a strict liability claim, as well as to claims for negligence and
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.3i3 To successfully
assert assumption of the risk, a defendant must show three elements:
(1) that the plaintiff was aware of and appreciated the specific risk or
danger that the defect created; (2) that the plaintiff was aware of the
risk and voluntarily encountered it; and (3) that the plaintiff's choice
to encounter the risk was unreasonable. 314

c.

Misuse by User as a Defense in Maryland Tort Claims

Like assumption of the risk, misuse of a product is also a defense 315
to strict liability action. 316 Where misuse is the sole, intervening, or
superceding proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, a plaintiff may be
barred from recovering in a strict liability action. 317
Once a plaintiff meets the burden of going forward with a strict
liability claim by demonstrating that the defendant manufactured an
unreasonably dangerous, defective product that proximately caused
the plaintiff's injuries, the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove
311. [d. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747.
312. Assumption of the risk is enumerated in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) and a judicially recognized defense in actions based on strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346, 363
A.2d 955, 959-60 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
313. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597-98, 495 A.2d 348, 356
(1985); Phipps, 278 Md. at 346,363 A.2d at 959; Sheehan v. Anthony Pools,
50 Md. App. 614, 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 n.ll (1982).
314. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356 (citing Sheehan, 50 Md. App. at
626 n.ll, 440 A.2d at 1092 n.ll). In Ellsworth, the plaintiff sued the fabric
manufacturer and seller of her nightgown after it caught fire while she was
wearing it inside-out, severely and permanently i~uring her. [d. at 586, 495
A.2d at 351. See supra text accompanying notes 117-122 for the facts of
Ellsworth.

315. Maryland decisions recognize that evidence of misuse, although not technically an affirmative defense to be proved by a defendant, will defeat a strict
liability claim where the misuse is not reasonably foreseeable. Ellsworth, 303
Md. 581,495 A.2d 348; Phipps, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955; Klein v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276 (1992); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199,527 A.2d 1337 (1987).
316. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355. See also supra text accompanying notes 117-122, note 314 for the facts of Ellsworth.
317. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355.
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the plaintiff misused the defective product. 318 Misuse typically is a
jury issue. 3Ig
The defense of mishandling is included under the umbrella of misuse. 320 Mishandling occurs when an otherwise safe product becomes
harmful after being mishandled by its user. 321
d.

User's Alteration oj Product as a Defense in Maryland Tori Claims-

Evidence of substantial modification or alteration of a product after
it has left the seller's control also may defeat a claim for strict liability
in tort in Maryland. 322
2.

Section 18: Disclaimers, Limitations, Waivers and Other Contractual Exculpations as Defenses to Products Liability Claims for
Harm to Persons
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or
other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other
similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar
or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against
sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to
persons. 323

Section 18 provides that disclaimers by product distributors and
waivers by buyers do not bar or limit otherwise valid products liability
claims against sellers for harm to persons from new products that are
defective. 324 This section of the Restatement (Third) is entirely consistent with current Maryland law. 325
The General Assembly of Maryland afforded the same protection to
consumers, despite products liability waivers, found in section 18 of
the Restatement (Third).326 Similarly, in 1976, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held sellers unable to disclaim or limit warranties arising
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

323.
324.
325.

326.

[d. at 596, 495 A.2d at 355.
See, e.g., Klein, 92 Md. App. at 477,608 A.2d at 1276.
Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 587, 495 A.2d at 356.
[d. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356.
See generally Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d
955, 959 (1976); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 424, 475
A.2d 1243, 1251 (1984) (determining whether post-sale product modifications by owner constituted a substantial change or alteration in the condition under section 402A usually is a question of fact for jury). But see Hood
v. Ryobi Am. Corp. 181 F.3d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding post-sale
alteration of product defeated plaintiffs' claims of negligence and strict liability as a matter of law).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 18.
[d.
See Phipps, 278 Md. at 349, 363 A.2d at 962 ("Under § 402A of the Restatement, a limitation or exclusion of warranties is irrelevant to the question of
the seller's liability for injury caused by defective goods regardless of the
classification of the goods [as consumer goods or otherwise].").
[d.
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from sales of consumer goods under sections 2_316.1 327 and 2A-503 of
the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code in Phipps v. General
Motors Corp.328 The Phipps court, adopting section 402A of the Restatement (Second), stated: "Under [section] 402A of the Restatement, a limitation or exclusion of warranties is irrelevant to the question of a
seller's liability for injury caused by defective goods regardless of the
classification of goods."329
The court expanded this holding in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,330
by adopting comment j to section 402A, which requires sellers to warn
buyers of a known dangerous product. 331 Absent "knowledge, or by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ... danger," the seller
is not strictly liable for failure to warn. 332 The court stated that "[iJn a
strict liability failure to warn case ... where a product lacks a warning
because of insufficient knowledge on the part of the manufacturer or
in the scientific field, the product is not defective. "333

C.

Definitions

1.

Section 19: Definition of "Product"
For purposes of this Restatement:
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed
commercially for use or consumption. Other items,
such as real property and electricity, are products
when the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply
the rules stated in this Restatement.
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not
products.

327. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 2-316.1 (2000). Section 2-316.1 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code states in relevant part that "(2)
[a]ny oral or written language used by a seller of consumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify
the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, is unenforceable."
Id.
328. 278 Md. 337,349, 363 A.2d 955, 961 (1976). Section 2A-503 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code states in relevant part that
"[I] imitation, alteration or exclusion of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation, alteration or exclusion of damages where the loss is commercial is not prima facie unconscionable." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw
§ 2A-503 (2000).
329. Phipps, 278 Md. at 349, 363 A.2d at 962.
330. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
331. Id. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641.
332. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.j).
333. Id. at 438, 601 A.2d at 641.
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(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided
commercially, are not subject to the rules of this
Restatement. 334
Section 19 defines "products" as items distributed commercially for
use, particularly tangible, personal property-which most items classified as products tend to be-and certain improvements affixed to real
property, if used in a similar manner as tangible, personal property.335
Services and human blood are not products within the context of the
Restatement (Third}.336 Beyond these parameters, the issue of what is a
"product" for purposes of strict liability is an issue for the court to
decide as a matter of law. 337
a.

(1)

Categories oj Products Under Section 19 oj the Restatement (Third)

Intangible Personal Property

As to intangible personal property, two basic types are involved.
The first consists of information in media such as books, maps, and
navigational charts. First Amendment concerns about impinging on
free speech have caused most courts to refuse to apply strict liability
for the dissemination of false and defective information. 338 One exception in this area, however, appears to be false information contained in maps and navigational charts. 339
The second type of intangible product involves the transmission of
potentially harmful intangible forces, such as electricity and x-rays. Although there are no Maryland cases on point, a majority of courts in
other states have held that electricity becomes a "product" only when
it passes through the customer's meter and enters the customer's
premises. Prior to that point of entry electricity is considered a
"service. "340
334. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19.
335. Id.
336. Id. Human blood and human tissue are excluded from the scope of strict
liability for purposes of public policy.
337. Id. § 19 cmt. a.
338. See, e.g., Jones v. J. B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-18 (D. Md.
1988) (nursing student injured treating herself with constipation remedy
listed in nursing textbook). In Jones, the court held that a publisher was not
strictly liable for information disseminated in its books. See id. The court
distinguished author liability from publisher liability and noted that, depending on the "nature of publication, on the intended audience, on the
causation of fact, and on the foreseeability of damage," an author mayor
may not be liable. Id. at 1216. A publisher cannot, however, be liable for
the contents of an idea or knowledge in books or other published material
because to do so would violate the principles offree speech. See id. at 1217.
339. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding defendant's "product" is the taking of tabular-form FAA
landing specifications and portraying it on a graphical approach chart) (applying Nevada law).
340. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19 cmt. d.
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Real Property

A majority of courts hold that a defective product that is incorporated into an improvement to realty does not lose its identity as a
product, and that the manufacturer or a contractor may be strictly
liable for any damages proximately caused by the defect. 341
(3)

Services

Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) provides that services, even
those provided commercially, are not products. 342 Some transactions,
however, may involve hybrid situations where it is unclear whether the
seller is predominantly providing a service or is selling a product. 343
Depending on the facts, resolution of that issue may be one for the
jury.344

b.

Definition of a Product Utilized by Maryland Courts

Maryland defines a "product" as "a tangible article, including attachments, accessories, and component parts, and accompanying labels, warnings, instructions, and packaging."345 For purposes of
determining products liability, this definition includes component
parts and dust that contains asbestos. 346
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland classified human blood
obtained via a transfusion as a service rather than the sale of a product
after the plaintiff became infected with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) from receiving contaminated blood. 347 The
341. Id. § 19 cmt. e. Although not expressly addressed in its opinion, this principle appears to at least have been tacitly approved by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 647
A.2d 405 (1994), which allowed strict liability in tort recovery for asbestoscontaining surface treatment materials incorporated into structures of public buildings.
342. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19(c).
343. See id. § 20(c).
344. See, e.g., ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 638, 7lO A.2d 944, 968 (1998)
(holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge
the jury that a contractor could not be held strictly liable in tort if its predominant purpose was the provision of a service rather than a sale of a
product).
345. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 5-115 (1998).
346. Ford Motor Company v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 8, 703 A.2d 1315, 1318
(1998). (implying that asbestos-containing products as products subjecting
manufacturers to liability). In Wood, the plaintiffs, on behalf of their deceased husbands, brought wrongful death claims against the manufacturers
of asbestos-containing products. Id.
347. Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 73 Md. App. 1, 15, 532 A.2d 1081, lO89
(1987) (holding that blood from a transfusion is not a product for four
reasons: (1) it is the majority view throughout the country; (2) a transfusion
is not just the sale of blood; rather the patient is paying for the actual injection and application of medical skill; (3) a court must apply the theory to
all diseases contractible from transfusions; and (4) there is no distinction
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court reached this conclusion after reviewing a similar case in which
the New York Court of Appeals held that, although a hospital supplies
blood, its predominant function is to deliver the blood through
trained professionals-such as the hospital staff-and to provide
whatever medical treatment considered advisable. 348
Currently, those legally authorized to "obtain[], process[],
store[ ], distribute[ ], or use[ ] whole blood tissue, organs, or bones
or any substance derived from human blood, tissue, organs, or
bones"349 are granted statutory immunity from strict liability.350 Prior
to this statute, there was no indication that commercial preparers and
suppliers were excused from strict liability for infecting the recipient
of a blood transfusion. 351

2.

Section 20:
Distributes"

Definition of "One Who Sells or Otherwise

For purposes of this Restatement:
(a) One sells a product when, in a commercial context,
one transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or for resale leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial product sellers include, but
are not limited to, manufacturers, wholesalers, and
retailers.
(b) One otherwise distributes a product when, in a commercial transaction other than a sale, one provides the
product to another either for use or consumption or
as a preliminary step leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial nonsale product distributors
include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and
those who provide products to others as a means of
promoting either the use or consumption of such
products or some other commercial activity.
(c) One also sells or otherwise distributes a product when,
in a commercial transaction, one provides a combination of products and services and either the transaction taken as a whole, or the product component

348.
349.

350.
351.

based on whether the patient was infected receiving some other service
from the hospital).
Id. Before July 1,1986, a court deciding whether a blood transfusion with
contaminated blood a product looked to Maryland common law. Id. at 10,
532 A.2d at 1086.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-402 (2000). The law provides, "[a] legally authorized person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses
whole blood tissue, organs, or bones or any substance derived from human
blood, tissue, organs, or bones shall have immunity from liability described
under § 5-630 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article." Id.
Id.
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 713,556 A.2d 1107, 1111 (1989).
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thereof, satisfies the criteria in Subsection (a) or
(b).352
Section 20 defines "one who sells or otherwise distributes" for purposes of imposing liability for doing so with a defective product in
order to impose strict liability within the context of the Restatement
(Third).353 Generally, this phrase refers to a person or entity involved
in transferring ownership to another seller, component-part manufacturer, distributor, or to the end-user.354 This section departs from section 402A of the Restatement (Second) by recognizing that sales occur at
all levels in the distributive chain including manufacturer sellers,
wholesale sellers and retail sellers. 355 Section 20 includes actual sales
as well as promotional merchandise and free samples. 356 In addition,
commercial lessors of new and like-new products are treated alike. 357
Products in an obviously used condition, however, fall under section 8
of the Restatement (Third).358
Bailments also fall within the scope of section 20. "When the defendant is in the business of selling the same type of product as is the
subject of the bailment, the sellor/bailor is subject to strict liability for
harm caused by defects."359 If a customer is merely permitted to use
an item while on the bailor's premises, such as a bowling ball or a
chair, however, a different rule applies. 360 Thus, "when products are
made available as a convenience to customers who are on the defendant's premises primarily for different, although related purposes,
and no separate charge is made, strict liability is not imposed."361
Lastly, section 20 touches upon "sale-service hybrid transactions"
and notes that courts are split on whether to treat such transactions as
a sale (subject to strict liability) or a service. 362 Regardless of which
type of transaction has occurred, a product being developed that injures a plaintiff is not considered to .be distributed into the stream of
commerce and cannot be the basis of a product claim. 363 The prod352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

360.
361.

362.
363.

(THIRD) § 20.
[d.
See id.
See id. § 20 cmt. b.
[d.
[d.
[d. § 20 cmt. c.
[d. § 20 cmt. f (stating that "an automobile dealer who allows a prospective
customer to test-drive a demonstrator will be treated the same as a seller of
the demonstrator car").
See id. § 20 cmt. c.
[d. § 20 cmt. f (stating that "even when sale of a product is not contemplated, the commercial bailor is subject to strict liability if a charge is imposed as a condition of the bailment. Thus, a laundromat is subject to
strict liability for a defective clothes dryer, and a roller rink that rents skates
is treated similarly").
[d. § 20 cmt. d.
See Dreier, supra note 262, at 2147.
RESTATEMENT
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uct has not been sold or distributed and, therefore, principles of negligence must govern the plaintiff's claim.
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted strict liability in
Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,364 it expressly adopted the language of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second), which limited liability to "one
who sells a product in a defective condition."365 Additionally, "seller"
is defined in the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code as "a
person who sells or contracts to sell goods."366
Although other jurisdictions have extended strict liability under section 402A to nonsale transactions, such as leases and bailments,367 to
date Maryland has not expanded the reach of section 402A strict liability beyond the "sale" of a product. Lessors and bailors, however,
continue be treated under negligence principles in Maryland. 368
Section 20 ( c) recognizes that some transactions may involve hybrid
situations where it is unclear whether the seller is predominantly providing a service as opposed to selling a product. 369 Depending on the
facts, resolution of the issue may be one for the jury. For example, in
ACandS v. Abate,370 Maryland's intermediate appellate court held that
it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury
that a contractor could not be held strictly liable if its predominant
purpose was the provision of a service rather than a sale of a
product. 371

3.

Section 21: Definition of "Harm to Persons or Property:" Recovery
for Economic Loss
For purposes of this Restatement, hann to persons or property includes economic loss if caused by hann to:
(a) the plaintiff's person;

364. 278 Md. 337,363 A.2d 955 (1976).
365. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
366. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-103(1)(d) (2000); see also, e.g., Morris v.
Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1994); Frericks v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288,336 A.2d 118 (1975); Sheehan v. Anthony
Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982).
367. See Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 74, 285 A.2d 607, 6lO.
368. See, e.g., id. at 76, 285 A.2d at 611 (declining to impose strict liability on
lessor of product and refusing to apply VCC implied warranty provisions to
leases and bailments for hire because it applies to sales of goods); Pahanish
v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). In Pahanish, the plaintiff sued the operator of a horse riding stable, contending that
operator was strictly liable because the horse riding tack contained a latent
defect. [d. at 349, 517 A.2d at 1125. The plaintiff's complaint, however,
alleged only negligence, not strict liability. [d. at 354, 517 A.2d at 1128.
The court held that even if strict liability had been alleged in the pleadings,
it would not apply to a stable operator, who "was neither the manufacturer
or seller of the product." [d. at 354-55, 517 A.2d at 1128.
369. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 20(c).
370. 121 Md. App. 590, 7lO A.2d 944 (1998).
371. [d. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968.
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(b) the person of another when hann to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort
law; or
(c) the plaintiff's property other than the defective product itself. 372
Section 21 of the Restatement (Third) provides that "harm to persons
or property" as economic loss to the plaintiff, to another when it interferes with a plaintiff's interest, or the plaintiff's property.373 Maryland
law is consistent with the principles enunciated in this section 374 and
is, arguably, even more expansive. 375 Maryland may be more expansive than section 21 because recovery is allowed for economic loss,
which is defined as the cost of correcting the dangerous condition
when a product defect "creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of
death or personal injury."376
A manufacture must satisfY a two-part test that determines the degree of risk to avoid imposition of the economic loss rule. 377 Under
the first prong, the severity component,378 the nature of the possible
damage is considered; under the second prong, the probability component,379 the likelihood of serious injury is analyzed. 380 One factor
may outweigh the other. For example, if the risk from the defect is
severe, such as death or serious personal injury, then the probability
372. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2l.
373. Id.
374. A. J. Decoster v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 333 Md. 245, 260, 634 A.2d 1330,
1337 (1994) (limiting tort liability to situations where a product defect
causes physical harm to persons or to property other than the defective
product itself and allowing strict liability recovery under section 402A for
both physical harm to persons and to property).
375. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156-57,
647 A.2d 405, 410 (1994) (allowing strict liability recovery for costs of abating asbestos-containing building materials from structures of public buildings). In United States Gypsum Co., Baltimore City sought to recover
damages resulting from the cost of discovering, managing, rectifying, and
removing surface product~ containing asbestos in several city-owned buildings. Id. at 152, 647 A.2d at 408. The court provided that, although the
damages sought were purely economic, where the defect presented a substantial risk of personal injury or death, recovery is permitted. Id. at 157,
647 A.2d at 41l.
376. Id. at 156-57, 647 A.2d at 410; see also Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,
340 Md. 519, 545-46, 667 A.2d 624, 637-38 (1994) (barring recovery for
economic loss to homeowners who failed to establish that defects in plywood used in roofs had created serious and 'unreasonable risk of death or
personal injury in tort).
377. Morris, 340 Md. at 533, 667 A.2d at 63l.
378. This prong was developed from the holding of Council of Co-Owners Atlantis
Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517
A.2d 336, 345 (1986).
379. This prong was developed from the holding of United States Gypsum Co.
United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 156-58, 647 A.2d at 410-11.
380. Morris, 340 Md. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 632.
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factor maybe less determinative. 381 Similarly, if the probability of injury is great, the severity of the harm may be less. 382
VI.

CONCLUSION

Over the last forty years, thousands of judicial decisions nationwide
have fine-tuned and expanded upon the simple but profound enunciation of legal principle distilled into the ALI's Restatement (Second) formulation of Section 402A strict liability for defective products. The
evolution of products liability concepts sculpted by decades of common-law advance has necessitated the ALI's Restatement (Third). What
once was capable of articulation in two sentences of a single section of
ALI "black letter" now requires 21 sections and many more sentences
to convey.
By and large, the Maryland courts have traveled with the mainstream of other states' courts on an issue-laden journey from one Restatement to the next. Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
not yet had occasion to consider formal adoption of any particular
section of the Restatement (Third), the Maryland law of products liability
as developed by the Maryland courts under Section 402A has, in the
main, been very consistent with the precepts now encapsulated in the
Restatement (Third).
In a few areas, current Maryland law appears to diverge-sometimes
in a more liberal direction but at other times in a more conservative
way-from the principles of the Restatement (Third). Such areas include the circumstances under which a successor has a duty to warn of
the hazards of the products of its predecessor;383 whether non-compliance or compliance with government safety standards, respectively,
constitute per se liability or a per se defense;384 the circumstances under
which a seller of used products may be liable for a product defect;385
and providing for recovery of "economic loss" in Maryland not only
when there is actual harm to person or property, but also when there
is "a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or serious personal
injury. "386
Finally, other areas covered by the Restatement (Third) remain as yet
unexplored by Maryland judicial decisions. For example, Maryland
appellate precedent has yet to clearly address whether strict liability
will be extended to include bailors and lessors of products;387 the cir381. [d. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 631-32.
382. [d. In Morris, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied recovery to the
plaintiffs, finding that the defective product did not present a substantial
risk of death or serious personal injury. [d. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
383. See supra notes 224-41 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 187-202 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 372-82 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 352-68 and accompanying text.
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cumstances, if any, under which intangible things (for example, electricity and X-rays) or things attached to real property will be
considered products;388 or the line of demarcation between a product
and a service in so-called hybrid transaction circumstances. 389 Maryland courts have not yet considered whether to embrace the "no-netbenefit-to-any-class-of-patient" liability requirement for prescription
drugs and medical devices of section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third);390
the circumstances under which component-parts sellers may be liable
for defects in the final product even though the component itself is
not defective;391 or whether to adopt, as the Maryland federal district
court believes they will, the "reasonable consumer-expectation" test
for tainted food products. 392 Importantly, Maryland courts also have
yet to decide whether to follow the admonishment of section 2, comment n of the Restatement (Third) that courts should not submit under
different, confusing doctrinal labels, multiple theories of recovery in
jury charges in cases involving two or more factually identical defective-design claims or two or more factually identical failure-to-warn
claims. 393
In short, the Maryland judiciary is likely to have ample opportunity
for many interesting debates about the course they wish to chart for
Maryland products liability law for the decades yet to come-before
the ALI steps forward to announce a "Restatement (Fourth)."

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
supra Part II.B.2.
supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
supra Part II.B.3.a.
supra Part II.A.2.h.(l).
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APPENDIX:

SECTION

402A

OF

THE

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

Section 402A: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller. 394

394.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) § 402A.

